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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE: 
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION 
 
 
Public higher education is a large enterprise in the United States.  Total state 
expenditures for higher education totaled nearly $152 billion dollars in FY2008, 
accounting for over ten percent of total state expenditures and representing the single 
largest category of discretionary spending in most states (NASBO, 2009).  The last three 
decades have witnessed the introduction of hundreds of pieces of legislation across 
states which make structural changes to state higher education governance systems 
(Marcus, 1997; McLendon, Deaton, and Hearn, 2007).  Despite the ubiquity of state 
higher education governance change much remains unknown, both in terms of why 
states choose to enact reforms as well as the implications of state governance 
arrangements for institutional performance. 
 
This dissertation attempts to fill these critical gaps in knowledge.  First, it surveys the 
historical development of state higher education governance structures and reviews the 
limited empirical literature regarding the antecedents and impacts of various state 
approaches to higher education management.  Drawing on this literature, the first 
empirical chapter, utilizing hazard modeling, seeks to uncover the factors associated 
with state enactment of legislation decentralizing higher education governance.  It finds 
that state fiscal characteristics emerge as strong predictors of decentralization.  
Specifically, states with greater tax efforts are much less likely to decentralize, while 
states experiencing real dollar declines in tax revenues are much more likely to 
decentralize, all else constant.   
 
The second empirical chapter explores the implications of state management of public 
higher education for institutional degree completion rates.  Utilizing a unique, 
institutional-level dataset comprising 518 public, four-year institutions of higher 
education in the United States, it finds that, controlling for relevant institutional-level 
characteristics such as institutional selectivity, mission, and per-FTE student 
expenditures, inter-institutional competition emerges as a powerful predictor of student 
degree completion.  Institutions operating in more competitive environments—defined 
as states with less concentrated undergraduate enrollments and states with weaker 
higher education governance structures—graduate students at higher rates than 
institutions operating in less competitive environments.  The dissertation concludes by 
discussing the implications for these empirical findings for policy makers seeking to 
enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of public higher education. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
Higher Education Governance in Context 
Public higher education in the United States is a large enterprise.  According to the 
National Center for Education Statistics, total enrollment at public institutions across the 
United States totaled nearly 13.5 million in 2007, accounting for nearly 74 percent of 
enrollments across all sectors.  Institutions collectively received over $152 billion dollars 
from states in fiscal year (FY) 2008, including nearly $77 billion in state general fund 
appropriations.  Overall, state expenditures on public higher education represent the 
largest category of state discretionary spending, accounting for over ten percent of total 
state expenditures over this time period (National Association of State Budget Officers, 
2009).  Despite the enormity of public higher education, much remains unknown in 
terms of both how states reach decisions regarding the balance between institutional 
autonomy and state control as well as the implications of state regulatory posture for 
institutional performance.  From the perspective of the various stakeholders of public 
higher education, including students, institutional administrators, the public and state 
governments, the lack of quantitative empirical evidence regarding these relationships 
implies that decision making at all levels relies to some extent on assumptions and 
conjecture, the validity of which remains largely untested. 
From an international perspective, public higher education in the United States is highly 
decentralized, meaning that the institutions in the U.S. enjoy, on average, much greater 
autonomy and independence from government control than their European 
counterparts (McLendon & Hearn, 2009).  Looking only within the United States, a 
cursory examination of states reveals that much variation exists in the exact balance of 
power between states and the public institutions of higher education located within 
them.  Historically, states largely embraced a laissez-faire posture toward public higher 
education, allowing institutions a high degree of formal autonomy.  This began to 
change in the 1950s, a decade which witnessed the introduction of formal state 
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intervention in public higher education on a large scale due to the  expansion and 
growth of public higher education during this period (McLendon, Hearn, & Deaton, 
2006).  However, state action along these lines has been quite uneven.  While some 
states have embraced highly centralized management of public higher education, other 
states have vested power in the individual institutions and curtailed the role of state 
boards in managing public higher education.  Still other states have changed their 
posture over time, choosing to relax centralized governance structures or, conversely, 
taking action to further concentrate power with the state.  Broadly speaking, much 
remains unknown in terms of how states determine the appropriate balance between 
institutional autonomy and state control.  The extant literature is largely qualitative, 
utilizing a case study or comparative case study design of particularly innovative states, 
leaving questions of generalizability unanswered.  Ultimately, as McLendon (2003b) 
laments, “virtually nothing is known about how or why state governments undertake 
reforms of their higher education systems” (p. 58). 
While not much is known regarding state higher education policy formation and change, 
even less is known about the impact of state higher education governance on public 
institutions of higher education and, ultimately, the largest category of stakeholders for 
higher education:  students.  Partially to blame for this gap in the literature is the 
inherent complexity of institutions of higher education as producers of various goods, of 
which education of undergraduate students remains only one (albeit a particularly vital 
one, at least from the perspective of students and state governments—the primary 
external stakeholders of public higher education).  Some researchers, in observing the 
diversity in state higher education governance arrangements across states, have simply 
assumed that this variation implies that each state has strategically adopted a 
governance structure which complements its unique environment.  While the 
tautological nature of this axiom seems obvious, the absence of rigorous empirical 
examination of both the antecedents and impacts of state governance arrangements for 
higher education leaves much unresolved.  This dissertation attempts to fill these critical 
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gaps in the extant literature through a quantitative examination of the antecedents and 
impacts of state higher education governance arrangements.   
Organization of the Dissertation 
Chapter 1 presents the introduction, research questions, context, purpose, and 
significance of the dissertation.  Chapters 2 and 3 combine to summarize the existing 
knowledge regarding higher education governance in the United States.  Chapter 2 
surveys the evolution of higher education governance in the United States, beginning 
with the creation of the first institutions of higher education in the United States during 
the Colonial era and ending with the wave of governance changes that defines the late 
1990s and early 2000s.  Chapter 3 provides an overview of the existing literature 
regarding higher education governance, focusing on two key questions:  first, what are 
the determinants of state higher education governance change?  Second, what are the 
implications of state higher education governance arrangements for public institutions 
of higher education?  As these chapters reveal, limited evidence exists to answer these 
questions.  
Accordingly, Chapters 4 and 5, the two empirical chapters of this dissertation, seek to 
contribute to the extant literature through quantitative analyses which address these 
questions.  Chapter 4, utilizing hazard modeling, uncovers the factors associated with 
state adoption of legislation that decentralizes higher education governance, shifting 
the balance of power in favor of institutions.  Chapter 5 assesses the impact of state 
governance arrangements on student outcomes through a cross-sectional analysis of 
the institutional graduation rates of public, four-year institutions of higher education in 
the United States.  Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation and includes a discussion of the 
findings, a summary of the dissertation, conclusions, limitations, implications, and 
recommendations for future research. 
 
Copyright © Jacob Fowles 2010 
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CHAPTER 2  
HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES:  AUTONOMY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Introduction 
States have long struggled with determining the appropriate mechanisms through which 
to maintain and enhance the accountability of state systems for public higher education.  
As this review of this historical literature shows, much variation exists in state 
approaches along these lines which reflects not only evolution in state priorities for 
higher education as public institutions have faced increased demand from an 
increasingly diverse student population, but also divergence in consistency within and 
across states regarding the appropriate role of public higher education at a given time.  
This chapter provides a historical overview of the development and evolution of state 
higher education governance arrangements from the initial founding of institutions of 
higher education in the United States during the Colonial Period through the expansion 
of public higher education following World War II (WWII) through the beginning of the 
21st century.      
The Colonial Period to the Civil War:   Development of Higher Education in the United 
States 
 The first institutions of higher learning in the United States predate the American 
Revolution.  These institutions were generally similar to their European counterparts in 
structure, particularly the English universities of Oxford and Cambridge (1990).  Under 
this model, ultimate authority for institutional decision making was principally vested in 
two agencies:  a president and a board of trustees (Brubacher & Rudy, 2004).  This 
borrowing of the European model was intentional and often quite explicit:  for example, 
Haskins (1965) notes that the 1764 charter of Rhode Island College granted it “the same 
privileges, dignities, and immunities enjoyed by the American colleges and European 
universities” (p. 21).  While these early institutions were neither public nor private as 
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these terms are defined today1, institutions of that era were widely recognized as 
afforded a  greater degree of freedom far beyond that enjoyed by other public 
bureaucracies or “creatures of the state” (McLendon & Hearn, 2009; Thelin, 2004).   
Historically, some scholars have argued that the colonial period represents the pinnacle 
of autonomy for American institutions, with some even going so far as to say that 
institutions enjoyed “complete autonomy” (Pliner, 1966).  However, the research of 
other scholars has cast serious doubt on the validity of this assertion, arguing that 
institutions, no matter how autonomous they appeared, nonetheless functioned within 
the context and under the shadow of the colonies in which they resided.  For instance, 
Rudolph (1990, p. 14) notes that Harvard’s charter gave the colonial Massachusetts 
government some control over the university’s governance, a power that the General 
Court exercised in removing the university’s president in 1639.  Although the charters of 
other institutions granted them more autonomy from the control of colonial 
governments, Rudolph (1990) also notes that institutional reliance on public 
appropriations was not the exception but the rule for many institutions.  This was 
especially true after the American Revolution when the charters issued by the English 
monarchy were altered, not just to omit reference to English authority but also to more 
explicitly define institutions as state-controlled (or at least, guided) entities (Thelin, 
2004, p. 43). 
As America established its independence, a critical difference between higher education 
governance in the United States and the European model arose as a product of the 
enumeration of responsibilities granted to the federal government in both Article I, 
Section 8 and the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  Unlike the explicit 
mandates for the regulation of defense, currency, and commerce, the Constitution 
makes no similar provision for federal control of higher education.  Because of the lack 
of specific delegation of authority (as well as the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of 
                                                          
1 Herbst (Whitehead and Herbst, 1986) contends that the appropriate term for 
institutions of this era is “provincial,” reflecting the institution’s role as a “colony’s or 
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non-enumerated powers to the states), the United States created no federal body 
overseeing higher education and, beyond the military service academies, founded no 
national universities.2  Instead, unlike its European counterparts, the individual states 
were left largely to their own devices in terms of developing and shaping their own 
systems of higher education.   
This difference proved to be especially divisive for the chartering of new institutions.   As 
Thelin (2004) notes, the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were demarcated by 
a rapid proliferation of institutional foundings:  Between 1800 and 1860, the number of 
degree-granting colleges in the U.S. increased nearly tenfold (p. 41-42).  However, some 
debate exists as to the driving force behind this proliferation of institutions.  Certainly, 
much of this growth is attributable to increased demand for higher education, 
particularly in the South (Thelin, 2004, p. 52; Rudolph, 1990, p. 36).  On the supply side, 
the relatively lax standards for obtaining a charter from state governments were clearly 
a contributing factor.  For example, Thelin (2004) notes that charters were often granted 
as political spoils by state government officials to reward loyalty (p. 43).  The 
enthusiastic approach to chartering is perhaps best expressed by Rudolph (1990), who 
states that “College-founding in the nineteenth century was undertaken in the same 
spirit as canal-building, cotton-ginning, farming, and gold-mining.  In none of these 
activities did completely rational procedures prevail” (p. 48).   
As one might expect, the exuberance in state chartering did not always yield successful 
institutions.  In fact, so many universities were chartered by the states and subsequently 
closed that Brubacher and Rudy (2004) called the era between the Revolutionary and 
Civil Wars the “forgotten period” of American higher education.  Tewksbury’s (1969) 
seminal work on the subject computed an average institutional mortality rate of 81 
percent.  While others (Naylor, 1973) argue that Tewksbury overestimates the true 
                                                          
2 This is not to say that the foundation of a national university was never considered.  
Trow (2003) provides an excellent historical overview of the debate surrounding the 
foundation of a national university, including the fact that George Washington left a 
sizable donation to the effort in his will. 
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mortality rate (revised estimates place it somewhere closer to 60 percent), this figure is 
nonetheless astoundingly high especially when contrasted with the institutional 
immutability that characterizes the public sector for higher education today.  Critically, 
few charters were accompanied by pledges of public dollars for financial support, a fact 
that undoubtedly made institutional survival less certain (Thelin, 2004).   
Another significant event in the evolution of the relationship between institutions and 
states that occurred during this period is the Dartmouth v. Woodward Supreme Court 
decision in 1819.  In this case, New Hampshire attempted, through legislative action, to 
gain control over the administration of Dartmouth College by expanding the size of its 
board of trustees and loading the vacant spots with appointments sympathetic to the 
desires of the state.   While the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the actions of 
the legislature, the U.S. Supreme Court, in their decision, ruled in favor of the college’s 
sovereignty.  Their decision upheld the sanctity of the college’s charter as a binding 
contract between the institution and the state that was protected from legislative 
interference by the U.S. Constitution’s Contract Clause (The Oyez Project). 
The implications of this decision for the development of higher education in the United 
States have been widely debated among scholars.  The traditional view is that this case 
was significant because it represents the first clear legal demarcation between public 
institutions and private ones (Rudolph, 1990; Whitehead & Herbst, 1986).  However, a 
more tempered view suggests that this is an overstatement.  Whitehead (Whitehead & 
Herbst, 1986) provides evidence that the distinction between public and private 
institutions (at least as the terms are used today) did not arise until the 1870s, much 
later than Dartmouth, although he acknowledges that clearly this distinction did exist—
at least for some—at the time of the court’s decision.  Instead, Whitehead (Whitehead 
& Herbst, 1986) argues that the court’s decision served another critical purpose:  It 
solidified the autonomy of chartered institutions and protected them from legislative 
tampering.  He cites Justice Story’s concurring opinion which states that all institutions 
should be free from legislative control as tangible evidence of the court’s intent. 
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The effects of this ruling are also debated in the literature.  McLendon (2003b) argues 
that Dartmouth induced the trend of granting institutional constitutional autonomy as 
states grew increasingly concerned about the influence of state politicians over 
institutional direction and management.  Brubacher (1967) argued that Dartmouth 
caused a legislative backlash in which states revised their chartering practices to  favor 
the creation of public institutions—institutions which vested the legislature with a high 
degree of control (p. 244).  Rudolph (1990) reaches the opposite conclusion, arguing 
that Dartmouth “checked the development of state universities for half a century” and 
promoted the founding of more private schools by religious and secular groups instilled 
with confidence in their ultimate ability to retain institutional control (p. 211).  Finally, 
Thelin (2004) argues that the enthusiasm for institutional building, which was high 
before Dartmouth, remained largely undiminished in its aftermath.  Trow (1988) echoes 
this sentiment, arguing that Dartmouth, combined with the limits on federal control of 
higher education built into the Constitution, set the groundwork for the development of 
an entrepreneurial and competitive market for higher education reflective of America’s 
faith in the powers of individual choice and free markets. 
The Civil War to World War II:  Diversification and Fragmentation  
The human and capital costs of the Civil War had a profound effect on demand for 
higher education in the United States.  The overall trend following the war was one of 
ever-increasing demand for higher education:  Total enrollment in higher education in 
the United States more than doubled from 1870 to 1890, and then more than doubled 
again to 355,000 by 1910 (Hofstadter & Hardy, 1952).  However, this growth was highly 
uneven:  While the East, West, and Midwest enjoyed unprecedented gains in terms of 
enrollments, colleges in the South were perhaps best characterized as “destitute,” 
lacking assets, facilities, and perhaps most critically, students (Stetar, 1985).   
Additionally, the expansive and evolving nature of the American economy in this era 
caused many to question the value of the traditional liberal arts education provided by 
the Oxbridge model, instead arguing that higher education should include more 
9 
 
practical vocational training in fields such as the mechanical arts and farming, among 
others.  This criticism of higher education became more acute in the aftermath of the 
Civil War when state economies, especially in the Southern states, struggled to 
overcome population loss and capital decimation.  In 1850, more than ten years before 
the Civil War, Francis Wayland, the president of Brown University, noted that at that 
time there existed no institutions “designed to furnish the agriculturalist, the 
manufacturer, the mechanic, or the merchant with the education that will prepare him 
for the profession to which his life is to be devoted” (Lee, 1963, p. 23).  However, within 
a generation, changes to the landscape for higher education in the United States would 
render Wayland’s criticism moot. 
This expansion of mission in this era is perhaps best exemplified by the passage of the 
Morrill Land-Grant College Act of 1862.  Under this Act, the federal government gave 
nearly eleven thousand square miles of federal land to the states to sell for the support 
of colleges and universities. Continuing the federal government’s laissez-faire approach 
towards higher education, the Act included very little stipulation regarding how the 
funds were to be spent by the states.  The major requirements were that funds were to 
be spent to support an institution teaching agriculture and the mechanical arts and that 
funds were to constitute an endowment to said institutions to be maintained in 
perpetuity (Lee, 1963).  As such, the states enjoyed a great deal of discretion in 
determining beneficiaries.  Some states used the money to found new institutions while 
others rewarded existing institutions, including a few denominational institutions and 
many institutions that today would be defined as “private” (Levine, 1993; Thelin, 2004).   
The Morrill Act also yielded critical changes in the relationship between states and 
institutions.  Before Morrill, public appropriations to universities were “simply not part 
of the vocabulary of the era” (Thelin, 2004, p. 72).  However, the stipulation that Morrill 
funds constitute an endowment in perpetuity meant that states were required to 
provide public funds for capital construction and, critically, capital maintenance.  As 
such, a noteworthy consequence of the Morrill Act was that it virtually forced states to 
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make regular and significant appropriations to support higher education, especially 
states that used Morrill funds to found new institutions.  Thelin (1982) provides 
evidence of the impact of the Morrill Act on state funding for higher education:  By 
1908, California, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin made annual appropriations to their 
universities in excess of one million dollars (as cited in McLendon, 2003). 
A second consequence of the Morrill Act of 1862 (and the subsequent Morrill Act of 
1890, which extended the act to include the former Confederate states) was an 
increased level of fragmentation in the provision of higher education in the various 
states.  Thelin (2004) notes that coordination and cooperation between institutions was 
largely nonexistent following the passage of the Morrill Act as institutions rushed to 
integrate technical education and other high-demand programs into curriculums.  
Programmatic duplication across institutions led to arguments about the appropriate 
structure for provision of these new programs.  This fragmentation was only enhanced 
as institutions battled for Morrill funding and land-grant status, creating heated rivalries 
that played out in public debate and on the floor of state legislatures.    
Further, the second Morrill Act required “a just and equitable” division of funds received 
under the Act to be dedicated to education of “colored students,” a requirement 
designed to prompt the Southern states to provide higher education for black students.  
Before 1890, only three predominantly black schools received any land-grant funds.  
Immediately following the passage of the second Morrill Act, seventeen of the nineteen 
Southern states established dual public land-grant institutions in order to retain 
eligibility for Morrill funding (Borwn, 1999, p. 3). 
Additionally, the long-standing trend of issuing charters as political spoils continued into 
the late nineteenth century with little regard to institutional purpose or state need.  As 
Glenny (1959) notes, “The successful politician proved his merit by bringing home an 
insane asylum, a prison, or a college.  Frequently it made little difference which” (p. 13).  
Expansion was further complicated by the fact that ambitious institutions became 
increasingly adept at lobbying for state funds, relying on influential alumni and local 
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politicians to secure public dollars.  Many state legislatures realized that “the 
assumption that lay [institutional] governing boards would protect the public interest 
was only partially correct” (Berdahl, 1971, p. 27).  While trustees generally seemed to 
exercise due caution in spending public dollars, they also seemed to be increasingly 
influenced by institutional ambitions.  However, state legislators of the day largely 
possessed neither the access nor the ability to digest objective, technical data about 
institutions to inform their decisions regarding institutional chartering or funding. 
As a result, many organizations, such as the American Council on Education and the 
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, became advocates for greater 
state control and oversight of higher education, arguing that the efficiency gains from 
consolidation outweighed the potential drawbacks of loss of institutional autonomy 
(Novak & Leslie, 2000).  Heeding this call, several states undertook efforts to introduce 
new oversight and consolidate control over higher education.  Initial efforts occurred in 
Oklahoma and Georgia, which simply placed smaller institutions under the supervision 
of the board of the land-grant college.  However, this arrangement was ultimately found 
to be insufficient as the institutional boards of the land-grant institutions were largely 
unwilling or unable to cooperate with subsidiary institutions in a productive or equitable 
manner (Glenny, 1959).   
As a further step, several states abolished all institutional boards, creating consolidated 
boards empowered with control over the internal administration of all individual 
institutions.  The first state to adopt this arrangement was Florida in 1905, followed by 
Iowa in 1906.  By the beginning of the Great Depression, eleven states had adopted this 
approach (Halstead, 1974).  These arrangements were popular with legislatures for 
several reasons.  First, they promised to eliminate much of the political conflict 
regarding state appropriations as legislatures could simply make a lump-sum 
appropriation to the governing board to distribute among its constituent institutions.  
Second, they promised to enhance overall system productivity and efficiency by 
coordinating the degree offerings across institutions and reducing duplication and 
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overlap.  Third, they promised to enhance public accountability of higher education by 
vesting control of board appointments with legislatures rather than with the institutions 
themselves as well as providing legislators with a single point of contact within the 
system for higher education. 
As Halstead (1974) notes, these goals were not always achieved in practice.  A few 
boards were particularly effective:  Berdahl (1971) notes that Georgia’s governing 
board, which was created in 1931, closed ten institutions in order to reduce duplication 
of degree offerings.  However, the majority were much less successful, for a variety of 
reasons.  States faced considerable legal obstacles to making such drastic changes to 
institutional governance.  Additionally, institutions resisted the adoption of consolidated 
governing boards and employed creative ways to circumvent their authority, viewing 
them as an encroachment on essential institutional autonomy.  Finally, many states, 
especially those experiencing fiscal prosperity, simply seemed to lack the political 
willpower to introduce such drastic change to higher education.  Ultimately, early 
efforts to coordinate and control state higher education systems were less than 
effective, leaving “diversity and independence to dominate American higher education 
until after World War II” (Halstead, 1974, p. 7). 
World War II to the 1960s:  Expansion and Evolution of Higher Education Governance 
While some states experimented with higher education governance prior to WWII, it 
was only in the aftermath of the war that state efforts to control or coordinate higher 
education were truly undertaken in earnest in most states.  McLendon’s (2003b) review 
of the literature synthesizes eight distinct trends that contributed to increased state 
intervention into higher education:  1) increases in institutional complexity; 2) increases 
in the demand for higher education, due in large part to the popularity of the G.I. Bill; 3) 
increases in the political and social scrutiny of higher education; 4) increases in the 
demands placed on higher education by the federal government; 5) an overall shift in 
state governance approaches towards centralization and control; 6) the proliferation of 
the executive budget which provided governors with tighter control over state 
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government expenditures; 7) increases in legislative professionalization; and 8) an 
overall increase in competition between institutions for resources, including state 
funding (pp. 67-68). 
As a result of these trends, states became much more systematic in their efforts to 
shape and steer public higher education.  In 1939, 33 states reported having no state 
agency for higher education.  Thirty years later, this number was reduced to two:  
Delaware and Vermont (Berdahl, 1971).  As many authors have recognized, much 
variation existed between the governance arrangements adopted by states 
(McGuinness, Epper, & Arredondo, 1994).  However, researchers largely agree that 
three common approaches emerged among state efforts to steer public higher 
education:  voluntary coordination, coordinating boards, and consolidated governing 
boards. 
Among the three types, consolidated governing boards represent the most authoritative 
form of coordination.  Consolidated governing boards supplant institutional governing 
boards and are empowered with all duties previously assigned to institutional boards, 
including “the management and control of finances and property, conferring of degrees, 
faculty personnel matters, and courses of instruction” (Glenny, 1959, p. 35).  
Additionally, the absolute nature of the power granted to consolidated governing 
boards means that they are also responsible for coordination across institutions, a 
power that in some states is expressly delegated and in others implied (Glenny, 1959).  
Consolidated governing boards have historically been exclusively composed of members 
appointed by state governments representing the public interest, although in a few 
cases boards also include members representing institutional interests (Berdahl, 1971). 
Voluntary coordination represents the opposite end of the spectrum.  Under this 
arrangement, institutional representatives (typically institutional presidents or members 
of institutional governing boards) meet more or less informally to coordinate 
institutional policies.  While many states facilitate regular meeting schedules (often by 
statutorily requiring meetings of institutional officials at regular intervals), Glenny (1959) 
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notes that, in other states, voluntary coordination is of an ad hoc nature, meeting only 
to address contingencies as they arise.  In many states, voluntary coordination is 
inherently linked to the budgeting process:  Institutional representatives meet to agree 
upon a unified budget request that is presented to the legislature.  Critically, voluntary 
coordination necessarily contains no impetus for cooperation beyond institutional self-
interest.  
Falling somewhere between these two extremes are coordinating boards.  Coordinating 
boards are generally created with very specific enumerated powers to coordinate state 
public higher education and have no authority over the governance of individual 
institutions.  Unlike consolidated governing boards, coordinating boards are 
superimposed on existing governance patterns rather than supplanting them.   
Wide variation exists among states as to the extent of the powers enumerated to 
coordinating boards by states.  Researchers generally recognize two types of 
coordinating boards:  advisory coordinating boards and regulatory coordinating boards 
(Berdahl, 1971; Glenny, 1959; Paltridge, 1965).  As one might expect, the difference 
between these two board types is largely in the relative strength of their enumerated 
powers.   As McGuinness (McGuinness, et al., 1994) notes, advisory and regulatory 
coordinating boards differ as to the specific enumeration of their powers along critical 
dimensions including the review of budgets, the role of the board in making budgetary 
recommendations to the state and the review of new and existing institutional academic 
program offerings.  Generally, regulatory boards have coercive powers in these areas 
while advisory boards are empowered only to make recommendations that institutional 
governing boards can choose to heed or ignore.  However, much like the powers 
enumerated to the federal government, the power of a coordinating board is subject to 
interpretation, leading to subtle de facto differences in board powers across states and 
over time.  Moving beyond this dichotomy, coordinating boards also vary as to their 
membership.  Some coordinating boards are composed exclusively of public members 
while others include significant institutional representation (Berdahl, 1971).  
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The following table, which originally appears in Paltridge (1965), conveys the evolution 
of state approaches toward higher education governance from the end of the Great 
Depression until 1965. 
Table 2-1:  State Higher Education Governance Systems, 1940-1965* 
Organization type 1940 1950 1960 1965 
No organization 33 29 18 6 
Voluntary Association 0 2 6 3 
Advisory Coordinating Board 1 1 5 13 
Regulatory Coordinating Board 1 2 4 11 
Consolidated Governing Board 15 16 17 17 
*Between 1960 and 1963, three states discontinued voluntary coordination while three 
other states adopted it. 
As this table shows, the post-WWII era, argued by many to be the era of the emergence 
of systematic higher education governance in the United States, is perhaps more 
appropriately labeled the era of the coordinating board.   Growth in the utilization of the 
consolidated governing board was largely nonexistent; rather, the states with these 
governance systems adopted them in the period between the Great Depression and 
World War II.  Similarly, a few states experimented with voluntary associations during 
this period (most notably Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Colorado); however, for most 
states, voluntary associations represented a brief intermediary between the absence of 
organization and the adoption of a more formal governance structure (Moos & Rourke, 
1959).   
In contrast, coordinating boards experienced wide adoption in the 1960s following a 
relatively slow start that began with Kentucky’s creation of the first coordinating board 
in 1934 (Halstead, 1974).  The literature points to several causes for the popularity of 
coordinating boards in this era.  First, coordinating boards could be created and vested 
with limited statutory power, leaving institutional governing boards largely undisturbed 
and circumventing the need for serious statutory reform or, in the case of a few states, 
constitutional amendment (Glenny, Berdahl, Palola, & Paltridge, 1971).  Second, 
coordinating boards were adopted in many states as a compromise between voluntary 
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associations, which state governments viewed as ineffective in protecting the public 
interest, and consolidated governing boards, which institutions viewed as overly 
intrusive.  As Glenny et al. (1971) discuss, coordinating boards were seen as functioning 
in the “no-man’s-land between higher education and the state government,” balancing 
the interests and needs of both parties; as such, they were often more politically 
palatable than more extreme governance arrangements (p. 18). 
The 1970s:  Maturation and Reorganization 
The 1970s were demarcated by an increased federal intervention into higher education 
which frequently led to expansion of the scope of authority of state higher education 
governance systems.  McGuinness (McGuinness, et al., 1994) notes that this 
intervention was accomplished through four changes passed as part of the Higher 
Education Act Amendments of 1972 and its later amendments.  First, the federal 
government forced states to increase oversight of higher education by tying eligibility 
for federal student aid to state licensure of institutions.  Second, the federal 
government expanded need-based aid for states, awarding matching grants to 
supplement state appropriations for need-based aid.  This dramatic increase in funding 
prompted many states to either create new agencies for management of aid programs 
or delegate the authority to manage these programs to the existing state board for 
higher education, thereby expanding the scope of the board’s authority.  Third, state 
eligibility for certain federal dollars required states to engage in long-term planning.  
While many states had delegated long-term planning responsibilities to their 
coordinating or governing boards, these new federal requirements carried specific 
requirements for the composition and duties of boards that conflicted with existing 
governance membership in many states, leading many to consider changes in 
governance to ensure eligibility.  Finally, changes in federal Stafford loan programs led 
many states to develop state guarantee agencies in order to ensure eligibility for this 
program, expanding the state government’s role in facilitating financial aid for students. 
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Additionally, the 1970s represent the first decade since the Civil War that did not 
experience a significant expansion in demand for higher education.  As such, many state 
governments became increasingly concerned with system efficiency and maximizing the 
return of tax dollars invested in public higher education.  In some states, this concern 
translated into increases in the authority of state boards and reductions in institutional 
autonomy.  McLendon’s (2003) review of the literature found this action to be 
consistent with the recommendations made in much of the literature of the day, 
although he notes that these recommendations were largely made in spite of a “notable 
absence of empirical research on the consequences of different regulatory 
relationships” (p. 80).   However, other scholars argued that states were becoming 
heavy handed in their management of public higher education, worrying that 
coordinating boards were shifting from their position as objective intermediaries 
between states and institutions to more closely resemble “just another agency of state 
government” (Glenny & Daglish, 1973, p. 141).  Despite the concerns, the overall trend 
in governance change during the 1970s was one of expansion of the scope and authority 
of state boards.  During this time period, seven states enhanced the power of their 
coordinating boards while two states abandoned their coordinating board structure and 
created consolidated governing boards (McGuinness, et al., 1994). 
The 1980s and 1990s:  Decentralization and Debate 
The 1980s and 1990s were an era of renewed debate regarding the appropriate role of 
states in steering public higher education.  McGuinness (McGuinness, et al., 1994) notes 
that much of this discussion was prompted by increased state and public concerns with 
the quality of the education provided by state public higher education systems.  Overall, 
this concern translated in many states into increased centralization of authority and 
decreases of institutional autonomy, especially in the 1980s.  Marcus (1997) notes that, 
of the 14 states that enacted governance reform in the 1980s, 12 decreased institutional 
autonomy and gave greater control over public higher education to state boards.  
Nebraska abandoned its planning commission in favor of a new regulatory coordinating 
board while Colorado and Washington replaced existing coordinating boards with 
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stronger ones.  In Texas and Maryland, legislation consolidated authority by combining 
existing boards into a single agency.   
Similarly, concern about institutional quality in some states simply led to increased 
regulation and monitoring of institutions, resulting in a de facto reduction in 
institutional autonomy.  McGuinness’ (McGuinness, et al., 1994) survey revealed that, 
by 1990, more than two thirds of states had implemented some form of system-wide 
student assessment.   Some states simply expanded the scope of the data that 
institutions were required to submit to state boards beyond finance and enrollment to 
include measures of student achievement such as dropout and graduation rates.  Others 
went farther, implementing standardized achievement tests similar to those given to 
primary and secondary students (Ewell, 1985).  A few, such as Florida, even went so far 
as to make passage of this test a requirement for upper classman status at public 
universities. 
However, in contrast to the long-standing trend toward increased centralization, a few 
states chose to decentralize their higher education systems during the 1980s, granting 
institutions additional autonomy (Marcus, 1997).  New Jersey granted its nine state 
colleges additional control over matters of operations and personnel, increasing their 
control over the “day-to-day affairs” of the campuses (Marcus, 1997, p. 401).  West 
Virginia abolished its consolidated governing board and established two new governing 
boards:  one for universities and a second for state colleges, community colleges, and 
technical institutes, recognizing the differing missions of these two groups of 
institutions.  McLendon’s (2003) survey of the literature attributes the decentralizations 
of the 1980s to the economic downturn during this time which created “downward 
pressure on state budgets and on higher education funding levels in particular” (p. 82). 
While the trend towards centralization continued in many states in the 1990s, several 
authors note that decentralization became much more common in this era (Marcus, 
1997; McGuinness, et al., 1994; McLendon, 2003b).  Three states (Illinois, 
Massachusetts, and New Jersey) dissolved long-standing governance structures and 
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adopted less centralized versions.  Illinois replaced multi-institution governing boards 
with individual governing boards.  New Jersey replaced its powerful regulatory 
coordinating board with a weaker one, transferring much of the power formerly 
reserved for the coordinating board to the institutions themselves.  Finally, 
Massachusetts dissolved its powerful Board of Regents and divided its powers between 
institutional boards and a newly-created coordinating board (Marcus, 1997).   
Additionally, many states adopted smaller changes which had the effect of increasing 
institutional autonomy.  Connecticut allowed its institutions to submit budget requests 
directly to the governor.  Virginia granted institutions additional control over 
institutional operations.  South Carolina added institutional representation to the state’s 
coordinating board.  Oregon allowed its institutions greater control over personnel, 
purchasing, and contracting (Marcus, 1997).  Hawaii’s legislature voted to allow the 
university system to retain tuition revenues rather than remit them to the state 
(McLendon, 2003).   
Unlike the decentralizations of the 1980s, the causes of the decentralizations of the 
1990s are much more difficult to identify.  McGuinness (McGuinness, et al., 1994) 
argues that, like the 1980s, declining economic conditions functioned as catalysts for the 
decentralizations of this period.  McLendon (2003) argues that the decentralization of 
higher education governance in the 1990s is simply reflective of a larger trend in 
government towards decentralization and deregulation (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). 
Conclusion  
As this historical overview has demonstrated, governmental approaches to the 
management of public higher education have varied widely, both across states and over 
time.  Synthesis of the historical trends suggest little in terms of overarching themes; 
while some states have moved in a consistent direction towards centralization or 
decentralization over time, the modal state is much less consistent and much more 
difficult to neatly categorize.  In these states, the posture of government in regard to 
public higher education varies, suggesting that states are perhaps myopic in their 
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approaches, reacting to short-term contingencies with little consideration for long-term 
stability.  As the next chapter reveals, this historical trend continues to define 
management of state public higher education today.  Ultimately, much remains 
unknown regarding how states approach management of public higher education.  
Further, little is known about the implications for these choices on system performance, 
leaving state governments with little to guide them in formulating effective and efficient 
policies. 
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CHAPTER 3  
ANTECEDENTS AND IPMACTS OF STATE HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE:  A 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 Introduction 
As many researchers have noted, much variation exists in state approaches to oversight 
of public higher education  (Berdahl, 1971; McGuinness, et al., 1994).  In spite of this 
rich and varied history, the relationship between states and public institutions of higher 
education remains largely understudied (McLendon, 2003b).  What drives the 
differences in governance approaches observed both across states and over time?  Does 
the governance structure adopted by a state impact institutional actions and outcomes?  
A growing body of theoretical and empirical literature broadly suggests that governance 
structures impact bureaucratic performance, although relatively little of this literature 
specifically deals with higher education governance (Knott & Payne, 2004).  This chapter 
provides a review of the extant literature relating to the antecedents and impacts of 
state management of public higher education.     
Higher Education Governance:  A Principal-Agent Perspective 
In its most basic conception, principal-agent theory, building on the neoclassical 
economic theory of the firm, deals with the contract between a principal and an agent 
in which the agent is empowered to act on behalf of the principal.  A problem arises 
when “(a) the desires or goals of the principal and the agent conflict and (b) it is difficult 
or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing” (Eisenhardt, 
1989, p. 58).  As Lane and Kivisto (2008) note, the ultimate question becomes how to 
“empower an agent to fulfill the needs of the principal, while at the same time 
constraining the agent from shirking on their responsibilities” (p. 142).  Scholars have 
adapted this theoretical framework to studies of governments, modifying the explicit 
contract utilized by the pure economic application to an implicit contract which 
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accompanies the creation of a bureaucratic organization or a legislative appropriation 
(Lane, 2007).      
Moe (1984) argues that “the whole of politics is structured by a chain of principal-agent 
relationships” (p. 765).  Perhaps nowhere is the axiom appropriate than within higher 
education governance.  First, there exist clearly demarcated differences in preferences 
between institutions and states.  States invest public dollars into higher education 
primarily as a means to increase the state’s “educational capital”—the number of 
skilled, knowledgeable people in the state’s workforce (Ewell, Jones, & Kelly, 2003).  As 
such, states expect that institutions will strategically utilize public dollars in the most 
productive and efficient manner possible to maximize returns on the state’s investment.  
Typically, this translates into expectations for high quality teaching and better student 
experiences while maintaining low tuition prices (Knott & Payne, 2004; Payne & 
Roberts, 2004).   
A large vein of literature generally agrees that institutions of higher education seek to 
maximize prestige, although this assumption is most applicable to research-extensive 
and intensive universities (Brewer, Gates, & Goldman, 2004; Garvin, 1980; James, 1986; 
Thompson, 1981).  As Lane and Kivisto (2008) discuss, prestige is important for both 
monetary and non-monetary reasons: 
[Prestige] is highly associated with good quality and good quality is associated 
with effective and expensive educational and research services.  Further, 
possessing a good reputation enhances a university’s social standing in the larger 
academic community.  Prestige is also important because it contributes to the 
financial survival of the university.  By developing a reputation as a prestigious 
institution, the market area of a university is likely to be expanded. (p. 160) 
Melguizo and Strober (2007) note that prestige in higher education leads to the 
“Matthew effect”—to those  that have, more is given (p. 637).  Prestigious institutions 
are more likely to attract top faculty, the brightest students, and the biggest donors, all 
of which only serve to reinforce and further enhance institutional prestige.  Critically, as 
James (1986, 1990a) notes, the pursuit of prestige frequently leads to shirking (at least 
from the perspective of external stakeholders) in the form of cross-subsidization in 
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which institutions transfer resources from low-prestige activities, such as undergraduate 
education, to higher-prestige activities, such as graduate education and research—
activities that in the eyes of some policymakers represent a violation of the implicit 
contract which accompanies the appropriation of public dollars to institutions.  
Second, higher education production is characterized by information asymmetry:  
Institutions of higher education know much more than do state governments regarding 
the true costs of education production and the quality of education being provided.  
This asymmetry problem is compounded by the fact that higher education is largely an 
“experience good” which cannot be properly evaluated until after purchase; indeed, it 
may be years after degree completion before an individual has sufficient information to 
evaluate whether the investment in higher education has paid sufficient labor market 
dividends to offset the expense incurred (Nelson, 1974).  States face similar challenges 
in accurately gauging the returns to investment of public dollars into higher education 
because of the inherent difficulty in reaching consensus on the appropriate outcomes 
through which institutional performance should be measured.  Heller (2004) attributes 
this to two primary factors:  the ambiguous nature of institutional goals and the 
difficulty in practice in establishing accountability based on these goals. 
Scholars have long struggled to catalogue the benefits of higher education, for a variety 
of reasons.  While a number of studies show that degree attainment has direct and 
measurable economic impacts that accumulate to the individual, researchers have long 
argued that at least some of the returns to higher education are social and cultural in 
nature and accrue not only to the individual who obtains the degree but also to the 
public at large (Hearn & Holdsworth, 2002).  Accordingly, Table 3-1 below, adapted from 
a report issued by the Institute for Higher Education Policy (1998), categorizes the 
outcomes of higher education along two dimensions:  the nature of the benefits and to 
whom the benefits accrue. 
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Table 3-1:  The Outcomes of Higher Education 
 Public Private 
Economic 
Increased Tax Revenues 
Greater Productivity 
Increased Consumption 
Increased Workforce Flexibility 
Decreased Reliance on Public 
Support 
Higher Salaries and Benefits 
Employment 
Higher Personal Savings 
Improved Working Conditions 
Personal and Professional Mobility 
Social 
Reduced Crime Rates 
Increased Charitable Giving 
Increased Quality of Civic Life 
Social Cohesion/Appreciation of 
Diversity 
Improved Ability to Adapt to 
Technology 
Improved Health and Life 
Expectancy 
Improved Quality of Life for 
Offspring 
Better Consumer Decision Making 
Increased Personal Status 
More Hobbies and Leisure Activities 
 
While there is little disagreement about these objectives in principle, Heller (2004) notes 
that many outcomes of higher education are both difficult to measure and often 
impossible for higher education to achieve unilaterally, making effective and efficient 
accountability difficult in practice.  Unlike primary and secondary education, there exists 
no comprehensive, systematic test which measures the value accrued to students by 
higher education attainment (Eykamp, 1995).  While many states have adopted 
performance indicators to gauge the efficiency and effectiveness of public higher 
education systems, these approaches are often overly simplistic and are seen by many 
in higher education as overly intrusive (Hearn & Holdsworth, 2002).  As Toma (1990) 
laments, “Education is a good in which the inputs are often used as measures of output, 
because of the difficulty in measuring the latter” (p. 3).  This is a statement that is borne 
out by the ranking criteria utilized by such high profile organizations as Barron’s and U.S. 
News and World Report, which focus on such metrics as average ACT and SAT scores of 
matriculating freshman and admission selectivity. 
An Overview of State Approaches to Higher Education Governance 
Glenny and Bowen (1977) argue that “state intervention in the affairs of higher 
education takes place in almost infinite ways” (p. 17), a statement that reflects the idea 
of states as laboratories of policy experimentation (Dye, 1990).  However, much 
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empirical work has recognized commonalities in state approaches toward higher 
education governance (Berdahl, 1971; Glenny & Bowen, 1977; Lowry, 2001b; 
McGuinness, et al., 1994).  Primarily, as McLendon (2003a) notes, state control of public 
institutions of higher education in most states has been achieved through the creation 
of statewide boards of higher education.  These boards are charged with maintaining 
consistency between institutional actions and state priorities (Knott & Payne, 2004), 
although the specifics of the range and degree of authority they are granted over 
institutions varies across states.   
The literature generally recognizes two broad types of state boards:  consolidated 
governing boards and coordinating boards.  Figure 3-1 below, utilizing data collected by 
the Education Commission of the States (ECS) and supplemented with data from the 
State Higher Education Executive Officers (SHEEO), displays the configuration of state 
higher education governance systems as of 2007, the most recent year for which 
complete data are available. 
Figure 3-1:  State Configurations for Higher Education Governance* 
 
*Alaska and Hawaii (not pictured) both employ consolidated governing boards. 
As this figure reveals, there is much variation across states regarding governance 
structures for higher education.  Twenty-three states employ consolidated governing 
boards; 25 states employ coordinating boards; and two states have only statutory or 
constitutional state planning agencies.  Additionally, two states (Alaska and New 
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Hampshire) employ both a consolidated governing board as well as a second board of a 
different type:  Alaska has a statewide coordinating board, while New Hampshire has a 
statutory planning agency.  For the current purpose, a state with boards of both types is 
coded as having a consolidated governing board.   
Consolidated governing boards are the more powerful form of higher education 
governance utilized by states.  They are empowered with both the coordinating 
functions enjoyed by coordinating boards as well as the day-to-day management of 
institutions, including management and control of finances, degrees, personnel, and 
property (Glenny, 1959).   Typically, consolidated governing boards are formed by 
dissolving all other institutional-level organizational structures such as boards of 
trustees or institutional governing boards.  As such, they are the sole entity charged 
with control of a state’s system for public higher education (Berdahl, 1971).  Among 
states employing consolidated governing boards, nine organize all public higher 
education under a single governing board; conversely, 14 states have two consolidated 
governing boards with the most frequent division of authority occurring between 
management of two-year and four-year institutions (McGuinness, 2003).   
The less powerful form of higher education governance (in terms of absolute authority 
and control over institutions) utilized by states is the coordinating board.  Coordinating 
boards work alongside institutional governing boards and are created with very specific 
enumerated powers which give them authority over issues of state coordination of 
higher education and prohibit their involvement in the governance of individual 
institutions.  Coordinating boards largely focus on issues such as credit transfer, 
programmatic duplication across institutions; as such, some have suggested that the 
role of the coordinating board is to represent state interests and counterbalance 
institutional ambitions if they run counter to statewide priorities (Millett, 1975). 
Following the nomenclature developed by Paltridge (1965) and Berdahl (1971), 
researchers have generally recognized two types of coordinating boards that are 
distinguished by whether or not the board enjoys institutional program approval 
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authority.  As this perhaps suggests, advisory coordinating boards lack program approval 
authority.  These boards are largely relegated to “reviewing and recommending” and 
lack coercive power along this dimension (McGuinness, et al., 1994; McLendon, 2000).  
Alternatively, regulatory coordinating boards are typically empowered with ultimate 
control over institutional academic programmatic offerings, frequently enjoying the 
power both to approve new programs and review and eliminate existing ones.  
Additionally, most states with regulatory coordinating boards have also granted the 
board some authority over the budgeting process, although the extent of the board’s 
control over budgeting varies.  Strong regulatory boards submit a unified budget 
request to the legislature and thereby enjoy a high degree of control over institutional 
budgets.  Weaker regulatory boards simply have the authority to review institutional 
budgets and make recommendations to the legislature but lack ultimate control over 
institutional budgetary requests. 
Glenny (1959) likens the relationship between regulatory coordinating boards and 
institutions to that of the federal government and the states:  In both, all powers are 
reserved for the lower level of government except those specifically enumerated to the 
higher (p. 39).  As he notes, the relationship between institutions and regulatory boards 
is often a complex one which hinges on an implicit, shared understanding of the 
boundaries of authority of both parties—an understanding which, similar to the 
relationship between the federal government and the states, may or may not exist at a 
given time.   
Figure 3-2 below, again drawing on data collected by the ECS and supplemented by data 
from SHEEO, displays the differences in the authority of coordinating boards across the 
states. 
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Figure 3-2:  Authority of State Coordinating Boards 
 
 As the figure reveals, there exists a large degree of difference in the powers granted to 
coordinating boards by states.  Only two states, California and New Mexico, have 
advisory coordinating boards—boards which enjoy very limited authority over both 
programmatic offering and institutional budgets.  Fifteen states have strong regulatory 
coordinating boards that are empowered with both program approval authority and 
ultimate budgetary authority.  Eight states have weaker regulatory boards that have 
more limited budgetary authority or, in the case of New York and Pennsylvania, have no 
role in the budgeting process.   
Additionally, researchers have historically recognized a third governance arrangement 
beyond the governing and coordinating boards:  voluntary coordination (Berdahl, 1971).  
Under this arrangement, states facilitate coordination among institutions, either 
formally or on an informal basis.  Critically, however, this arrangement carries no formal 
impetus for coordination beyond institutional self-interest.  Berdahl’s (1971) study of 
governance structures reveals that voluntary coordination peaked in popularity in the 
early 1960s as many states adopted this method of coordination as a temporary 
measure until more explicitly codified governance arrangements could be created.  As 
such, by 1970 voluntary coordination had largely been abandoned by states.  Currently, 
only Michigan and Delaware exclusively employ this arrangement.  Michigan’s State 
Board of Higher Education is granted very limited powers to make recommendations to 
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the legislature by the state’s constitution.  Similarly, Delaware’s statutorily-created 
Higher Education Commission’s authority extends only to data collection and reporting 
as well as oversight of interstate agreements.  Additionally, McGuinness (2003) notes 
that four states have statutory, constitutional, or voluntary planning agencies which 
supplement formal governance structures. 
Berdahl (1971) tracks the evolution of state higher education governance structures in 
the states from 1940 to 1970, a period which roughly corresponds to the infancy and 
adolescence of state higher education governance.  He finds that, over this time period, 
many states embraced wholesale change in their approach to governance:  While 33 
states had no state agency for higher education in 1940, this number had decreased to 
only two by 1969 (p. 35).  Similarly, over this time period, states generally displayed a 
great willingness to experiment with alternative governance arrangements.  For 
example, during the 1960s alone, seven states that had previously adopted either a 
coordinating or governance board chose to abandon their existing arrangement and 
adopt an entirely different one. 
However, in recent years, state higher education governance has reached a period of 
relative maturity in which change has largely become less extreme and more nuanced.  
While a few states have adopted broad and sweeping governance changes in the last 
couple of decades (i.e. Florida in the early 2000s and New Jersey in the early 1990s), 
researchers generally agree that the most recent wave of changes—at least since the 
1970s—have occurred largely incrementally or on the margins, tweaking existing 
governance systems rather than supplanting existing governance arrangements with 
wholly new systems. 
However, this is not to say that states have lost their appetite for experimentation and 
change in their approach to managing public institutions; in fact, quite the opposite is 
true.   Marcus (1997) identified over 50 proposals introduced by states to reform higher 
education governance in the early 1990s.  McLendon and Ness (2003) similarly found 
over 100 unique legislative efforts to modify higher education governance during the 
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late 1990s.  The legislative databases developed and maintained by the Association of 
Governing Boards (AGB) and the ECS confirm that this trend has continued into the 
2000s, cumulatively identifying more than 150 pieces of legislation introduced by states 
that impact state higher education governance in the early 2000s alone.  While the vast 
majority of these introduced pieces of legislation did not survive the legislative process, 
they nonetheless serve to convey the fact that policymakers in many states still struggle 
to find harmony between institutional autonomy and state control. 
Scholars generally agree that some degree of bureaucratic autonomy and discretion is 
vital for effective provision of services  (Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003).  However, 
from the perspective of governments, granting increased autonomy is certainly not 
without cost:  Holding all else constant, the greater the degree of autonomy granted to 
a bureaucratic organization, the greater the costs associated with monitoring agency 
behavior become (Waterman & Meier, 1998).  Additionally, governments also bear costs 
in applying rewards or sanctions to steer agencies, actions that potentially could have 
been avoided by initial curtailment of bureaucratic autonomy.  A critical dimension of 
this issue revolves around the organizational structure of bureaucratic agencies 
(Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003).  As this discussion shows, numerous considerations 
come into play when states face decisions about management of public higher 
education. 
 The Impact of Governance on State Systems for Higher Education 
Although a rich descriptive literature exists which chronicles the evolution of state 
higher education governance both over time and across states, comparatively little 
empirical work has explored the impact of state higher education governance on 
institutions.  This is largely reflective of the complexity and indirect nature of the 
interrelationship between states, governance structures, and institutions.  As Hearn and 
Holdsworth (2002) argue, “[s]tate influences tend to be channeled through a variety of 
intermediating agencies including . . . various on-campus authorities, including 
presidents, provosts, deans, admissions officers, academic councils, and faculty” (p. 8).  
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Figure 3-3 below, taken from Heller’s (2004) review of the literature, shows the two 
dominant analytical pathways taken by the literature as indicated by the solid and 
dashed arrows.  To date, the majority of research has focused exclusively on the link 
between governance characteristics and higher education inputs.  While several authors 
have attempted to link governance arrangements to outputs, efforts in this regard are 
very limited.   
Figure 3-3:  Models of Research on Higher Education Governance 
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between two types of policy innovations:  innovations that influence public higher 
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statistically significant influence on state adoption of one particular accountability 
policy:  performance funding (although it was unrelated to adoption of performance 
budgeting, which the authors argue constitutes a weaker form of accountability).  They 
find that states with highly centralized governance structures are less likely to adopt 
performance funding.  Finally, Hearn, McLendon and Mokher (2008) find no connection 
between governance and state adoption of unit-record data systems. 
A second vein of literature attempts to connect governance structure to various inputs 
or characteristics of the public higher education system.  Many of these articles focus 
specifically on institutional financial characteristics such as tuition price.  Lowry (2001a, 
2001b) finds that institutions with greater autonomy have higher net tuition and fee 
revenues, all else equal, than those located in states with more powerful and centralized  
governance arrangements.  Hearn, Griswold and Marine (1996) identify little 
consistency in the relationship between governance arrangements and tuition prices 
while Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2003) conclude that states with coordinating boards 
have lower tuition prices than states with governing boards.   
Regarding other institutional characteristics, Toma (1990) finds that institutions in states 
with more centralized higher education governance structures tend to have less reliance 
on tuition funding, greater student-teacher ratios, and higher percentages of tenured 
faculty than those in more decentralized states.  Zumeta (1996) finds that states with 
consolidated governing boards have lower per capita expenditures on higher education 
than states with less centralized structures.  Moody (2007) finds that public universities 
in states with highly centralized governance arrangements have less debt outstanding 
than those in decentralized states.  Finally, the most comprehensive effort to link higher 
education governance to system characteristics has been undertaken by Volkwein 
(Volkwein, 1986, 1989; Volkwein & Malik, 1997) who, in a series of articles, consistently 
finds no relationship between campus autonomy and two critical inputs to the higher 
education production function:  quality of faculty and institutional selectivity. 
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To date, very little empirical work speaks to the relationship between higher education 
governance structures and institutional outputs.  Knott and Payne (Knott & Payne, 
2004), looking at faculty research productivity, conclude that faculty at institutions in 
states with more centralized governance structures have lower levels of research 
productivity than their unfettered peers.  However, Payne and Roberts (2009), in an 
unpublished working paper, find that this effect differs for faculty at flagship and non-
flagship public institutions.   
What can be distilled from an analysis of this literature?  First, researchers are limited in 
drawing broad conclusions regarding the impact of governance on systems of public 
higher education by the paucity of the extant literature.  Beyond Volkwein’s series of 
analyses (Volkwein, 1986, 1989; Volkwein & Malik, 1997), the literature offers little in 
the way of replication.  Of particular importance in this regard are the differences across 
studies in how researchers measure centralization.  Toma (1990) and Lowry (2001a, 
2001b) generate a measure of centralization by creating a ratio of institutions to 
governing boards.  Volkwein (Volkwein, 1986, 1989; Volkwein & Malik, 1997) creates his 
own measures of institutional autonomy utilizing surveys of institutional administrators.  
Others rely on the broad categorizations of state higher education governance 
structures created by Paltridge (1965) and updated by Berdahl(1971), McGuinness 
(McGuinness, 1988; McGuinness, et al., 1994) and the staff of the ECS (1997, 2000, 
2007).  Researchers have long recognized that capturing the relevant characteristics of a 
state’s higher education governance system is a difficult task due to both the diversity 
observed across states and the complex nature of higher education governance.  
Clearly, much work remains to be done in this regard. 
Second, it is apparent that researchers make broadly differing assumptions about the 
relationship between governance centralization and bureaucratic preferences.  On one 
hand, some researchers argue that highly centralized governance structures should be 
more reflective of statewide priorities for higher education, including “low tuition, 
broad access, and undergraduate education” (Knott & Payne, 2004, p. 17) while 
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decentralized governance structures should be associated with closer alignment with 
the preferences of institutional administrators and faculty for policies that enhance 
institutional prestige.  Lowry (2001b), for instance, argues that a highly centralized 
board structure reduces board loyalty to any particular institution; further, the fact that 
centralized boards are typically accompanied by a sizable professional research staff 
further insulates them from the influence of institutional interests as they are less 
dependent on institutions for information (Lowry, 2001b, p. 848). 
However, other scholars have taken a different view, arguing that centralized board 
structures should be inherently more reflective of institutional interests.  Toma (1990) 
argues that the homogenization of policies associated with centralized boards 
constrains the public’s ability to express preferences through institutional choice, 
thereby empowering institutional actors in influencing board policies.  Similarly, 
Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2003), taking a transactions costs approach, argue that 
centralized boards should be more susceptible to influence by political actors—including 
institutional stakeholders—due to the lower costs that these groups face in attempting 
to influence these boards as compared to their decentralized peers.  McLendon, Hearn 
and Deaton (2006) simply argue that highly centralized boards are “dominated by 
academic stakeholders” and, therefore, are more closely aligned with institutional 
interests (p. 19). 
How are these seemingly opposing viewpoints to be reconciled?  An answer is provided 
by Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2003) who argue that: 
Centralized structures both create autonomy and facilitate access. . . To the 
extent that variation in governance structures is correlated with bureaucratic 
autonomy, it should limit the ability of elected officials to influence education 
policies.  The transactions costs of individuals seeking to influence overall agency 
policy are lowered, however, in more centralized organizations. (p. 80) 
The authors’ analysis confirms the complex and intricate role of structure.  They 
conclude that higher education governance mediates the effect of political actors on 
higher education but in seemingly idiosyncratic ways.  Seen from this perspective, a 
more holistic and nuanced approach to research, which more completely captures the 
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political and bureaucratic environments of states, is needed to detect systematic 
patterns regarding the impact of governance structures on state systems for public 
higher education.  As Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2003) conclude, research needs to 
explore “what kinds of political forces are mediated *or enabled+ by the various 
structures and how in combination these affect higher education policy” (p. 95).  For 
example, to date, only a single paper (Lowry, 2001b) explicitly considers the 
stakeholders represented in the membership of state boards of higher education in 
linking governance to system characteristics.  Similarly, the literature largely fails to 
consider the relative influence of interest groups in higher education decision making 
(Gray & Lowery, 2001; Tandberg, 2008).  Rich literatures in economics, public 
administration, and political science exist which can inform such endeavors. 
Conclusion 
As Heller (2004) emphasizes, to date, very little research has explored the impact of 
governance structure on higher education outputs, and no research has looked at the 
outcomes of state systems of higher education as articulated by the Institute for Higher 
Education Policy (1998).  While many researchers seem comfortable inferring the 
relationship between outputs and outcomes, others have explicitly expressed unease at 
the lack of empirical evidence to support this connection (Heller, 2004).  A robust 
literature in economics has looked at the returns to education from a human capital 
perspective, which builds on the pioneering work on the subject by Mincer (1958), 
Weisbrod (1962), and others.  This literature can provide a theoretical and empirical 
foundation for efforts to capture relevant outcome measures that can serve as 
dependent variables in this regard.  Certainly the task becomes more difficult as one 
moves away from estimating the private, economic benefits of education to estimating 
benefits which are social in nature or accrue to the public.  However, state efforts in 
developing unit-record data systems are moving these endeavors out of the realm of 
impossibility. 
Copyright © Jacob Fowles 2010  
36 
 
CHAPTER 4  
STATE DECENTRALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE: 
A HAZARD MODEL APPROACH 
Introduction 
The relationship between states and public higher education is one characterized by 
tension.  Policymakers have long struggled with defining the appropriate balance 
between institutional autonomy and public accountability.  State legislative histories 
provide convincing evidence of the inherent difficulty in achieving this balance:  
McLendon and Ness (2003), for example, identified over 100 initiatives to reform state 
higher education governance arrangements during the 1990s alone.  An emergent vein 
of the literature that relies on a case study or comparative case study design describes 
the process of higher education governance change in a handful of states.  However, as 
McLendon (2003b) notes, “Virtually nothing is known about how or why state 
governments undertake reforms of their higher education systems” (p. 58). 
Building on Kingdon’s (2003) multiple streams framework, the current research is an 
attempt to fill this gap.   Kingdon’s popular framework posits that policy change is driven 
by three independent streams:  politics, policies, and problems.  These independent 
streams couple to create “policy windows,” or the opportunity for policy change.  The 
extant literature regarding higher education governance change focuses almost 
exclusively on the politics stream, finding that, consistent with Kingdon’s prediction, 
political conflict and turnover are associated with higher education governance reform.  
Critically, the multiple streams framework emphasizes that no single stream can create 
governance change unilaterally, meaning that, although the existing literature may 
correctly identify the aspects of the politics stream that are associated with policy 
change, only part of the story is being told. 
Ultimately, much less is known about the role of the policies and problems stream in 
prompting higher education governance change.  This research focuses on the most 
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prevalent form of governance change—decentralization—and attempts to identify 
characteristics of the policies and problems streams that are associated with the 
enactment of governance reform.  Utilizing a unique dataset covering 49 states from 
2000 to 2006, I employ hazard modeling to estimate the factors that are associated with 
increased probability of enactment of policies that decentralize state higher education 
governance, modeling enactment of policies decreasing institutional autonomy as a 
competing risk. 
I find that state fiscal characteristics emerge as strong predictors of state adoption of 
higher education decentralization.  Specifically, I find that, holding all else constant, 
states with greater tax efforts are statistically significantly less likely to decentralize 
higher education governance while states experiencing declines in tax revenues are 
much more likely to decentralize.  This finding confirms that, similar to historical trend, 
the most recent wave of decentralization of higher education is strongly predicted by 
economic factors, a finding that is consistent with the qualitative literature looking at 
higher education governance change.  Regarding the policies stream, I find no evidence 
of regional policy diffusion, a finding consistent with the extant literature (McLendon, 
Deaton, and Hearn, 2007).  Further, I find very limited support for the influence of the 
internal determinants model.  State socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, 
tested both individually and jointly, are unrelated to propensity to decentralize.  Tested 
jointly, the characteristics of the overall state system for higher education are 
statistically unrelated to adoption of decentralization, although several of the included 
measures do reach statistical significance tested individually.  Ultimately, Kingdon’s 
characterization of the policies stream as “a primeval soup” in which multiple ideas are 
just “floating around” (2003, p. 165) may indeed be the best explanation for how policy 
solutions and policy problems come together.   
An Overview of Higher Education Governance 
Since the founding of the first universities in the United States, the relationship between 
universities and the states in which they reside has been intricate, dynamic, and 
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frequently contentious (Thelin, 2004, pp. 82-83).  Inherent to this relationship is the 
conflicting desires of the two parties:  Universities argue for greater individual 
autonomy while states increasingly call for higher accountability in exchange for public 
dollars (Lane, 2007; Mingle, 1983).  The higher education governance literature is 
riddled with metaphors employed by authors to try to facilitate understanding of this 
precarious relationship.  For example, Lane (2007) compares the relationship between 
the state and public institutions to an “intricate and clumsy dance with both partners 
often trying to play the role of the lead dancer” (p. 615).  Likewise, Martinez (2002) 
attempts to convey the complexity and intricacy of this relationship by likening 
researchers studying higher education governance to blind men describing different 
parts of an elephant without any conception of the characteristics of the complete 
animal (p. 349). 
As such, much of the early literature is descriptive in nature and recognized not because 
of nuance, but breadth.  Berdahl’s (1971) seminal work broke new ground in its 
comprehensiveness by developing the most complete categorization of the formal 
structures of state higher education governance systems to date.  His analysis 
recognizes broad four agency types:  voluntary associations, advisory coordinating 
boards (also known as planning agencies), regulatory coordinating boards, and 
consolidated governing boards.  This categorization still dominates the higher education 
governance literature today (although states have largely abandoned the voluntary 
association form of governance).  Essentially, his categorization represents a continuum, 
classifying states according to their formal authority.  This continuum is represented by 
Figure 4-1 below. 
Figure 4-1:  State Higher Education Governance Systems 
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Clearly, voluntary associations and consolidated governing boards represent the 
extreme ends of the spectrum:  Under these governance arrangements, institutions 
enjoy a high degree of autonomy and very little autonomy, respectively.  However, the 
classifications become much less distinct as the middle of the spectrum is approached.   
Typically, advisory coordinating boards are empowered solely to deal with issues of 
system coordination and efficiency and have little direct power over institutions beyond 
this relatively narrow scope.  However, similar to Congress’ expansive interpretation of 
the Commerce Clause, some state legislatures have settled upon an expansive definition 
of “coordination” as justification for granting their advisory coordinating boards specific 
powers typically reserved for more powerful board structires:  For instance, Kentucky’s 
advisory coordinating board enjoys statutory control over tuition-setting, a power that is 
in almost all other cases reserved for consolidated governing boards.  Examples such as 
this abound and represent real limits to the utility of Berdahl’s classification scheme, 
although this has not impinged upon its popularity in the empirical literature 
(McGuinness, et al., 1994). 
As this discussion has made clear, classifying a state higher education governance 
system as centralized or decentralized—and thereby gauging the relative autonomy of 
that system’s component institutions—is no simple task, primarily because of the 
inherent difficulty in operationalizing autonomy.  Berdahl (1971, 1990) and Leslie and 
Berdahl (2008) argue that institutional autonomy can be defined in two conceptually 
distinct ways:  procedural autonomy and substantive autonomy.  To quote Berdahl 
(1990): 
Substantive autonomy is the power of the university or college in its corporate 
form to determine its own goals and programmes--if you will, the what of 
academe.   
Procedural autonomy is the power of the university or college in its corporate 
form to determine the means by which its goals and programmes will be 
pursued--the how of academe [emphasis original]. (p. 172) 
Interestingly, Berdahl (1971) intentionally chooses to ignore changes in state procedural 
control over institutions of public higher education, arguing that procedural controls do 
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not “threaten the essential ingredients of autonomy” and that they are of “only 
marginal importance” (p. 10).   
As one might imagine, many disagree with Berdahl’s assertion.  Writing only six years 
after the publication of Berdahl’s book, Glenny and Bowen (1977) argue that 
substantive and procedural autonomy are intrinsically related by proposing a thought 
experiment in which a state imposes severe and comprehensive procedural controls on 
institutions.  Would the aggregate effect of these controls, ask the authors, not be 
tantamount to explicit limitation on substantive autonomy?  Further, while Berdahl 
discounts procedural autonomy as useful only for such mundane tasks as establishing 
common indicators and definitions of said indicators in order to facilitate data 
collection, Glenny and Bowen argue that this very act impinges upon substantive 
autonomy through implicit agenda-setting.  They argue that, by revealing to institutions 
the relative importance of performance indicators (and the preferred method of 
measuring these indicators), states are revealing their own preferences to the 
institutions they financially support (79).  Contrary to Berdahl’s (1971) assertions, most 
researchers recognize the implications of both substantive and procedural autonomy for 
institutional independence. 
This shortcoming notwithstanding, Berdahl’s distinction between substantive and 
procedural autonomy is one that has proven itself to be a useful analytical tool in 
analyzing higher education governance change and assessing the overall impact of these 
changes on system outcomes.  McLendon (2003b)and McLendon and Hearn (2009), 
among others, adopt this framework in categorizing state governance reforms but, 
following the example of Glenny and Bowen (1977), recognize that institutional 
autonomy is determined not solely based on substantive autonomy, but by both 
substantive and procedural autonomy.  Similarly, Volkwein and Malik (1997) argue that 
institutional autonomy is best measured along two dimensions:  financial/personnel 
flexibility and academic flexibility.  Financial/personnel flexibility captures the extent to 
which institutions have freedom over “managing budgets and revenues, expending 
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funds, setting tuition, and appointing personnel” while academic flexibility measures 
institutional control over “academic programs, degree requirements, standards, and 
departments” as well as “freedom from state-imposed accountability requirements” 
(Volkwein & Malik, 1997, p. 22).  While the authors assert that their scheme is largely 
congruent with Berdanl’s, it is not strictly identical:  Financial/personnel flexibility 
incorporates some aspects of substantive autonomy such as budgeting, while academic 
flexibility includes some aspects of procedural autonomy, such as management of 
academic departments. 
Going further, Berdahl also compared state governance systems along numerous 
dimensions, including staffing, planning, research capacity, budget review authority and 
program review authority.  These comparisons provide researchers with concrete 
examples of the differences that exist both across and within agency types as 
implemented by the various states.  In more recent years, Berdahl’s work has been 
continued and updated by the ECS’ State Postsecondary Structures Handbook 
(Education Commission of the States, 1997, 2000, 2007; McGuinness, 1988; 
McGuinness, et al., 1994).   
Moving beyond these macro-level, predominantly descriptive works, much research has 
attempted to provide insight as to the “development and functioning of different 
governance arrangements for higher education;” additionally, a growing literature exists 
which explores the issues of state higher education governance reform and change 
(Bastedo, 2009; Leslie & Berdahl, 2008; Leslie & Novak, 2003; Martinez, 1999; Mills, 
2007; RC Richardson, Finney, Bracco, & Callan, 1999) .  However, the bulk of this work 
has been qualitative (and frequently normative) in nature, providing little in the way of 
generalizability toward the development of a comprehensive, positive theory or 
framework explaining state higher education governance reform.   In fact, some of these 
authors explicitly argue that the development of such a theory would be “hard” (Mills, 
2007, p. 185) if not outright “impossible” (Leslie & Novak, 2003, p. 99), owing to the fact 
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that the political behavior associated with higher education governance change is 
thought to be sufficiently unsystematic as to defy prediction. 
Lending some credence to this assertion is the volatility observed in state higher 
education governance structures over time.  Marcus’  (1997) survey of 49 state higher 
education executive officers (SHEEOs) identified 25 legislative proposals designed to 
restructure state higher education governance systems between 1989 and 1994 and 
another 24 proposals initiated by other state officials.  A similar study by McLendon and 
Ness (2003), drawing on numerous primary and secondary sources,  identified more 
than 100 such proposals in the 1990s.  While some were enacted, the vast majority of 
the proposals identified by both Marcus and McLendon et al. stalled somewhere in the 
legislative process, failing to be signed into state law.  These restructuring initiatives 
varied widely in their scope.  While the majority propose change to state higher 
education governance systems on the margin, a few (e.g. legislation enacted in New 
Jersey in 1994 or a series of legislative actions in  Florida in the early 2000s) went much 
further, functionally discarding the entire existing state higher education governance 
system and constructing a new one from the ground up. 
Further complicating the search for an underlying theoretical explanation of governance 
change is the fact that, while earlier periods were demarcated by a general trend 
toward either centralization or decentralization, the most recent wave of reforms is 
more difficult to categorize.  Researchers generally agree that the period from the mid- 
1950s to the late 1970s can be categorized as a general trend towards centralization.  
Birdahl (1971) reports that, while 28 states had no state agency responsible for public 
higher education in 1949, this number fell to two only 20 years later with the majority of 
adopters choosing to create regulatory coordinating boards or consolidated governing 
boards.  The immediately succeeding decade saw a movement toward deregulation and 
decentralization that corresponded both with the recession of the early 1980s and the 
growth in popularity of the devolution and the “new federalism” movements in 
American government, which emphasized decentralized management and reliance on 
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markets to enhance efficiency (Donahue, 1997; McLendon, 2003b).  The most recent 
reforms (mid-1990s to present) reveal much more diversity in state approaches to 
higher education governance.  Some states have adopted new forms of centralization, 
such as performance funding, which allows states to provide direction to higher 
education while still permitting some degree of institutional choice (McLendon, et al., 
2006; Zumeta, 2000).  These new approaches toward governance seem to reflect the 
experimental attitude of states in post-devolution government service provision, which 
has been observed in other policy areas such as public assistance (Fording, Soss, & 
Schram, 2007; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O'Brien, 2001) and public healthcare provision 
(Bailey & Rom, 2008; Volden, 2006), coupled with an emergent focus on public 
accountability and efficiency.  As such, much of the focus of state higher education 
governance reform has centered on increasing overall system performance and 
preserving and expanding consumer choice while controlling or at least constraining 
expenditures.  Much variation exists across states with regard to the mechanisms 
employed to accomplish these goals. 
This discussion notwithstanding, however, the overall trend in higher education 
governance reform in recent years still seems largely focused on decentralization, as 
evidenced by Marcus’ (1997) survey of states that found that twice as many states 
proposed decentralizing higher education governance in the 1990s as in the 1980s 
(402).  McLendon’s (2003b) survey of the literature synthesizes four common 
approaches taken by legislatures in increasing institutional autonomy.  First, states have 
enacted legislation enhancing institutional management flexibility, a phenomenon 
referred to as deregulation elsewhere in the literature (McLendon & Hearn, 2009).  For 
example, under this approach, a state might exempt institutions from following state 
procurement laws or exempt institutions from state personnel hiring procedures.  
Returning to Berdahl’s categorization, this approach focuses more on procedural 
autonomy, allowing institutions greater control over process.  A second approach 
common to many state efforts to decentralize higher education governance has been 
the disaggregation of university governance systems.  Under this approach, legislatures 
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confer control, both substantive and procedural, of institutions from system- or state-
level boards to existing or newly-created institutional boards.  A third common 
approach has been to increase institutional autonomy by legislatively changing the 
status of institutions from purely public to a public/private hybrid.  This approach 
introduces fundamental change into the relationship between institutions and states in 
that institutions are no longer purely public entities; Instead, they enjoy much of the 
same autonomy and discretion as private institutions.  Typically, however, this 
autonomy is not without cost:  It is often accompanied by a greatly reduced public 
financial support.  The final common approach that states have taken to decentralizing 
higher education is modification of existing state governance systems to transfer 
authority from state boards to institutions.  Under this approach, a state might move 
from a regulatory coordinating board to an advisory coordinating board, retaining the 
state board’s ability to facilitate cooperation between institutions but transferring much 
of the ability to regulate the internal workings of boards to the institutions themselves.  
A weaker form of this approach might be for a state to change the balance of power on 
its board to include greater institutional representation. 
Understanding Higher Education Governance Change 
Why do states choose to adopt a particular governance arrangement?  What drives 
states to change these arrangements?   As McLendon, Deaton and Hearn (2007) note, 
“little is known empirically about the origins of governance change in public higher 
education” (p. 646).  A review of the relevant literature confirms this assertion.  The bulk 
of the research that addresses this topic adopts a case study or comparative case study 
approach, making generalization difficult.  However, a careful synthesis of these studies 
reveals a nearly universal conclusion:  State politics matters.  Bastedo (2009), for 
example, found that governance reform in Massachusetts relied upon the political 
capital that the state’s coordinating board chair had accrued during his work in state 
government and his efforts during the governor’s reelection campaign. Similarly, Mills’ 
(2007) account of governance change in Florida shows that the change adopted in that 
state relied upon the support of key political actors as well as recent Republican 
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assumption of legislative control.  Comparative case studies of Kentucky and Minnesota 
by Leslie and Novak (2003) reach similar conclusions, finding that the governance 
change in these states also hinged on political capital investments by key government 
officials, leading the authors to conclude that political factors were “usually central to 
the story of reform” (p. 117).  The emphasis on the importance of politics is also 
reinforced by the findings of McLendon, Deaton and Hearn (2007) who look at state 
legislative enactment of higher education governance change in 49 states from 1985 to 
2000.  They find that political instability, defined as transition from divided to single 
party legislative control, is associated with increased probability of adoption of 
governance change.   
Can politics be the sole explanation?  Many theoretical perspectives exist that seek to 
provide insight into the seemingly random process of policy change (Sabatier, 1999).  
Among these competing theories, Kingdon’s multiple streams framework has been quite 
influential (at least as measured by number of citations) in how researchers in the social 
sciences have approached understanding policy change.  However, despite the fact that 
McLendon (2003a) found that adoption of higher education governance reform in three 
states “strongly resembled” the multiple streams framework, with few exceptions, it has 
been largely ignored by the higher education literature (Mills, 2007; Ness & Mistretta, 
2009). 
Kingdon’s framework posits the existence of three largely independent streams—
problems, policies, and politics—which “flow through the governmental system . . . each 
according to its own unique set of internal dynamics and rules” (McLendon, 2003b, p. 
102).  The problem stream comprises issues that policymakers perceive as problems.  
Zahariadis (1999, p. 76) identifies three mechanisms through which issues or conditions 
can be elevated to the status of problem by policymakers, although he emphasizes the 
critical nature of randomness in the process.  First, indicators can convince policymakers 
of the magnitude of an issue.  Second, a focal event or crisis can call attention to a 
problem.  Third, feedback from existing programs can elevate conditions to problems.   
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The second stream discussed by Kingdon is the policies stream.  Essentially, the policies 
stream contains all potential policy actions that can be taken in response to the issue 
made salient by the problem stream.  While technically all relevant ideas are part of the 
policies stream, Zahariadis (1999) emphasizes that most do not ever receive serious 
consideration by policymakers for various reasons, including technical feasibility and 
value acceptability.   McLendon (2003a, pp. 507-508) identifies three mechanisms 
through which policy solutions can be identified.  First, they can be borrowed from the 
policy solutions enacted or considered by other states.  Second, they can be adopted 
from other policy areas. Finally, they can be developed by researchers or specialists who 
have special knowledge of the particular policy area of interest.   
The third stream identified by Kingdom is the politics stream.  It consists of three 
broadly defined elements:  public mood, interest group pressure, and governmental 
turnover.  According to Zahariadis (1999), the public mood and governmental turnover 
elements of the politics stream are particularly important in defining the politics stream.  
Kingdon (2003) emphasizes that no single stream is powerful enough to unilaterally 
bring about policy change.  Instead, at least two of the three streams must “couple,” 
creating “policy windows” or opportunities for policy change to occur.  Figure 4-2 
provides a graphical representation of Kingdon’s framework. 
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Figure 4-2:  Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Viewed through this framework, the extant literature dealing with higher education 
governance change has focused almost exclusively on the politics stream, and has, 
consistent with the predictions made by Kingdon (2003), generally agreed that political 
conflict and administrative and legislative turnover seem to be associated with higher 
education governance reform.  However, this focus on the politics stream has largely 
come at the expense of the problem and policies streams, which have received much 
less attention in the literature.  Kingdon’s framework explicitly asserts that policy 
change is not possible without the coupling of multiple streams, implying that, while the 
politics stream can contribute to policy change, it cannot unilaterally bring change 
about.  What factors, then, prepare the problem and policies stream for coupling? 
Regarding the problem stream, a perusal of the historical trends associated with higher 
education governance change provides some insight into this question.  McLendon and 
Hearn (2009) argue that the economic recessions of the 1970s and 1980s yielded a wave 
of governance decentralization as policymakers granted institutions greater autonomy 
in exchange for decreased public financial support.  However, similar economic 
underpinnings do not seem to be associated with legislative initiatives to decrease 
institutional autonomy, such as the implementation of performance funding for higher 
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education.  Instead, these movements seem more driven by concerns regarding 
institutional accountability and responsiveness to legislative priorities (Zumeta, 2000).   
Do economic conditions play a role in preparing the problems stream for coupling and 
thereby creating a window for policy change?   
To date, this question remains largely unanswered in the literature.  McLendon’s 
(2003a) comparative case study of higher education decentralization in Arkansas, 
Hawaii, and Illinois finds that the problem stream in these states is comprised of 
legislative concern over “state economic stagnation or decline *and+ budget crisis” (p. 
507).  Do these findings generalize beyond these states?  McLendon, Deaton and Hearn 
(2007), in the only research to date which quantitatively studies the antecedents of 
higher education governance change, fail to find empirical support for the influence of 
state economic conditions on the adoption of governance reform.  However, the 
dependent variable used in this analysis is governance change, which captures 
enactment of both centralization and decentralization, implying that their results apply 
to governance change generally rather than to centralization or decentralization 
specifically.  As such, their results suggest that political turmoil seems associated with 
both adoption of decentralization and centralization, a conclusion which is largely 
consistent with Kingdon’s model.  However, regarding the problem stream, they find no 
evidence of common antecedents to policy change, a finding which is perhaps explained 
by the authors’ overly broad definition of policy change which includes both 
centralization and decentralization.  By looking at only a single type of change—
decentralization—the current research represents the first empirical test of test 
McLendon’s (2003a) hypothesis that higher education governance decentralization is 
prompted by economic conditions. 
Similarly, a review of the literature provides some insight as to the development of the 
policies stream.  Adoption and diffusion of innovation in state governments is a subject 
that has long held the attention of social scientists from a number of disciplines, 
including sociology, economics, public administration, political science, and education.  
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Early work on the subject focused almost exclusively on intrastate factors affecting 
policy adoption (Dawson & Robinson, 1963).  Walker’s work (1969) is widely recognized 
as the first theoretical and empirical attempt to “develop propositions which might be 
used as guides to the study of the diffusion of innovations” systematically across the 
U.S. states (p. 881).  It synthesizes the disparate factors discussed in the previous 
literature that influence state policy adoption, building an integrated model that 
includes state demographic, economic, and political characteristics, as well as measures 
of policy diffusion which can occur nationally, regionally, or through state participation 
in professional membership organizations such as the Council of State Governments 
(CSG) or the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO) (Walker, 1969, p. 
894).   
Building on Walker’s work, Gray (1973) developed regression models that include a 
parameter which captures policy diffusion as a function of both previous state adoption 
and the interaction between adopters and potential adopters (p. 1176).  Gray’s 
theoretical framework and modeling approach introduced a new level of 
methodological sophistication into the study of policy innovation.  However, her work 
shares a common deficiency with the policy diffusion literature of the time:  lack of a 
comprehensive theoretical model which unites elements of both the internal 
determinants and diffusion models.  Although both Walker (1969) and Gray (1973) 
provide substantive empirical tests of the validity of the internal determinants and 
diffusion models independently, neither fully integrates both models into a single 
framework.   
This integration was accomplished by Berry and Berry (1990) who recognized that 
“neither a pure regional diffusion model nor a pure internal determinants model 
*provides+ a pure plausible explanation of state innovation in isolation” (p. 396).  Berry 
and Berry, in a study of the determinants of the adoption of state lotteries, introduce a 
theoretical model that unites both the internal determinants and policy diffusion 
models.  Relying on an analytical approach borrowed from the medical literature known 
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as event history analysis, they find support for both the internal determinants and the 
regional diffusion models as well as an interactive effect between the two.   In their 
concluding remarks, they argue persuasively that researchers should move away from 
both cross-sectional analyses of policy adoption and empirical approaches that do not 
integrate the diffusion and internal determinants models in favor of more dynamic 
empirical approaches (441). 
Since Berry and Berry’s innovative approach to the study of policy adoption, researchers 
seem to have been highly persuaded by both the authors’ plea for dynamic modeling 
approaches and their innovative analytical approach, although empirical support for 
regional policy diffusion has been decidedly mixed.  Mooney’s (2001) review of the 
policy diffusion literature shows that only 12 of the 24 policy diffusion studies published 
in top political science journals estimate “positive and statistically significant  
coefficients for the regional effect [at conventional  -levels+” (p. 107).  This finding has 
led some researchers to theorize that the policy diffusion literature largely 
oversimplified the operationalization of the learning process in which states engage 
when making decisions regarding policy adoption.  For instance, Grossback, Nicholson-
Crotty & Peterson (2004) find evidence that states rely on ideological cues from other 
states to learn about innovative policies, while Mooney (2001) argues that current 
measures of policy adoption and diffusion fail to recognize the fact that states can learn 
from the negative experiences of other states’ policy innovations and choose not to 
adopt a policy on this basis, rather than strictly through emulation.  Ultimately, while 
the introduction of event history analysis into the policy adoption literature has allowed 
for much more nuanced analysis of the factors associated with state policy adoption and 
innovation, the differing policy areas and analytical models present little in the way of 
consistency of findings:  While some studies find strong support for policy diffusion, 
others find little to support the idea that states emulate, learn, and compete with each 
other along policy dimensions. 
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Applying the policy adoption literature to higher education governance change yields 
several plausible mechanisms through which the policies stream is developed.  Marcus’ 
(1997) survey of SHEEOs identifies regional patterns in the initiation of governance 
reform, finding that West Virginia’s reform mirrored that of neighboring Virginia, while 
reforms in New Jersey and Massachusetts were also similar in design.  However, his 
univariate analytical technique fails to control for other potentially relevant variables 
that could explain these similarities.  McLendon, Deaton and Hearn (2007), utilizing 
event history analysis, find no evidence of policy diffusion in their study of higher 
education governance change after controlling for other state characteristics.  However, 
to date, these are the only two studies which specifically address this question.  Is 
governance decentralization in higher education driven by interstate diffusion of policy, 
the internal determinants model, or some combination thereof? 
Predicting Governance Decentralization 
For the purposes of conducting the analysis, a dataset was compiled for 49 states 
spanning the years 2000 to 2006.3  The observed dependent variable in this analysis is 
the adoption of legislation which decentralizes higher education governance.  To be 
coded as decentralizing legislation, enacted legislation had to meet one or more of the 
following criteria, as described by McLendon (2003a): 
1. Transfer decision-making authority of institutional management from the state 
level to the system or campus level; 
2. Disaggregate institutional governance systems; 
3. Reconstitute institutions as public corporations; or  
4. Introduce substantial modification to state governance systems which empowers 
institutions. 
These four categories represent the most common approaches that states have taken in 
decentralizing higher education governance and are purposefully utilized in order to 
capture changes in both substantive and procedural autonomy.  Enacted legislation 
                                                          
3 Nebraska was omitted due to its unique unicameral legislative structure.  
52 
 
achieving the opposite of the aforementioned criteria was recorded as centralizing 
legislation for the purposes of modeling the competing risk. 
The data regarding higher education governance changes were derived from a variety of 
sources, including the legislation databases of the Education Commission of the States, 
the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, as well as the data 
collected by McLendon and Ness (2003).  These sources were augmented by keyword 
searches of Westlaw’s state legislative database, Google News archives, and the online 
archives of the Chronicle for Higher Education.  From these sources, six non-repeated 
centralization and 12 non-repeated decentralization events were identified.  These 
events are described in greater detail in the table below (“D” indicates decentralization, 
while “C” indicates centralization). 
Table 4-1:  Enacted Legislation Changing Higher Education Governance, 2000-2006 
State Year Type Description 
FL 2000 D 
Abolishes board of regents of state university system, 
establishes individual institutional governing boards 
HI 2000 D 
Proposes constitutional amendment eliminating Hawaii Board 
of Regents' requirement to get legislative approval for policy 
formulation 
MD 2000 C 
Give state board programmatic and mission oversight of 
regional education centers, previously controlled by 
institutions 
TN 2000 C 
Requires Tennessee Higher Education Commission approval of 
new branch or satellite campuses of existing state institutions 
ND 2001 C 
Grants state board power to fire university system personnel 
and set their job duties 
AZ 2002 D 
Transfers community college oversight authority from State 
Board of Directors to individual community college district 
governing boards 
SC 2002 D Increases institutional representation on state board councils 
CO 2003 D 
Dissolves the Board of State Colleges, establishes independent 
governing boards for Mesa State, Adams State, and Western 
State 
IL 2003 D 
Appoints faculty representative to the state board for higher 
education 
NV 2003 C 
Proposes constitutional amendment to permit governor to 
appoint board of regent members 
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Table 4-1 (continued) 
OR 2003 D 
Exempts universities from having to use State Administrative 
Services for procurement 
TX 2003 D Shifts tuition-setting authority from legislature to institutions 
KY 2004 C 
Moves control of community college system from University 
of Kentucky to state board for community colleges 
VA 2004 D 
Adds faculty representative to state board of community 
colleges 
NH 2005 D 
Grants regional community college boards the power to 
appoint and fix compensation of institutional presidents 
KS 2006 D 
Grants institutions greater autonomy over purchasing and 
insurance 
LA 2006 D 
Removes authority of board of regents to confirm presidential 
nominees 
RI 2006 C 
Grants governor power to remove state board members for 
cause 
 
Based on the literature and the theoretical discussion above, the model includes five 
categories of independent variables:  state fiscal health, state political variables, 
characteristics of the state system for higher education, state socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics, and a variable capturing policy adoption patterns across 
states.    Table 4-2 presents definitions, sources, and descriptive statistics for the 
variables included in the analysis.4 
 State Fiscal Characteristics 
The model includes two related measures of state fiscal characteristics.  Tax revenue as 
a percentage of gross state product is included to measure the relative tax effort of 
states.  The model also includes an indicator variable that is set equal to one if a state 
experienced a real dollar decline in total tax revenue as compared to the immediately 
preceding year.  Drawing on Kingdon’s multiple streams framework and consistent with 
the previous literature, poorer fiscal health (tax revenue declines and lower tax 
revenues as a percent of gross state product) is hypothesized to prime the problems 
                                                          
4 Due to the bias that would be introduced by producing descriptive statistics covering 
all periods of active spells, means and standard deviations are provided for variables 
only for the initial period of all spells, FY2000. 
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stream for coupling, and is therefore expected to be associated with higher propensity 
to decentralize higher education.  Both of these variables are lagged one year.   
 State System for Higher Education 
The model includes six variables designed to capture the impact of the state’s system 
for higher education.  First, I include an indicator variable that is set equal to one if a 
state has a coordinating board for higher education governance.  McLendon, Deaton, 
and Hearn (2007) find no relationship between existing governance structure and 
propensity to adopt governance change, although they hypothesize that states with 
coordinating boards should be more likely to enact governance reform due to the 
inherent political instability associated with these boards as compared to consolidated 
governing boards.  However, looking solely at decentralization adds additional 
ambiguity to this discussion:  While coordinating boards might be more politically 
unstable and, therefore, more prone to governance change, governing boards are 
inherently more centralized, and, therefore, perhaps offer more opportunity for 
decentralization.  As such, I have no expectation for the effect of this variable on 
propensity to decentralize.   
I also include a variable that measures the relative share of educational costs borne by 
students.  Given the attention that has been recently given to increases in cost of 
attendance at public universities, this variable is expected to be inversely related to 
propensity to decentralize and, returning to Kingdon’s multiple streams, provides a 
potential alternative mechanism through which the problems stream can be developed.   
Also included are two variables that capture the overall size of a state’s public system 
for higher education.  The first variable records the total state public full-time equivalent 
(FTE) enrollment.  The second is an indicator variable that is set equal to one if a state’s 
total public FTE enrollment has grown since the previous year.  Both variables are lagged 
one year.  As McLendon, Deaton, and Hearn (2007) argue, historical evidence suggests 
that, all else equal, larger enrollments have led to greater governmental control over 
higher education.  Additional enrollments place “added burdens on state budgets, 
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ratcheting up scrutiny” on public higher education (McLendon, Deaton, and Hearn, 
2007, p. 655).  Following this logic, I expect that, all else equal, both overall size and 
growth of the public system for higher education should be negatively associated with 
adoption of decentralization.   
Additionally, two variables are included to capture the state’s higher education 
enrollment mix.  First, a variable is included that captures the percentage of the total 
state FTE enrollment that is enrolled at private institutions.  As McLendon (2003a) 
discusses, an important source of solutions for the policies stream is emulation, the 
source of which can be either internal or external.  As such, we could anticipate that 
states with strong traditions of private higher education would draw from that tradition 
in formulating policy for public higher education.   There is some limited evidence 
supporting this idea.  For instance, the Grapevine surveys of higher education finance 
generally find that states with a strong private tradition of higher education tend to 
embrace a more market-like approach toward funding public institutions, relying on the 
high-tuition, high-aid model that is prevalent in private institutions.   Given the highly 
decentralized nature of private higher education governance, I expect that states with 
larger private sectors for higher education are more likely to emulate this sector in 
determining public higher education governance and are more likely to adopt 
decentralization. 
Second, I include a variable that captures the state enrollment mix between two-and 
four-year institutions. The two-year sector for higher education is, as many authors 
note, very different from the four-year sector in terms of both mission and clientele.   
While states have embraced widely differing approaches toward governance of the two-
year sector, Richardson and los Santos (2000) argue that states with more centralized 
governance structures for the two-year sector have faced significant challenges in 
developing coherent and efficient policies that reflect this differing nature, especially in 
states where the two- and four-year sectors are managed by a single centralized board.  
This challenge has become particularly pronounced in states that have experienced 
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rapid and significant growth in demand in the two-year sector due to evolving economic 
and demographic factors.  Therefore, I expect that, all else equal, states that have 
relatively large two-year sectors for higher education are more likely to decentralize in 
order to promote both overall fiscal efficiency as well as divergent public interests. 
 State Political Variables 
In order to capture the effect of state politics on policy adoption, the model includes 
three variables:  two indicator variables that reflect single party control of government 
(both chambers of the legislature and the governor’s office), as well as a measure of 
voter turnout in the immediately preceding presidential election.  The policy adoption 
literature argues that single party control of government, regardless of party, facilitates 
policy innovation by “removing ‘roadblocks’ resulting from the need to compromise 
between two parties” (Berry and Berry, 1990, p. 403).  Therefore, I could hypothesize 
that unified party control of government should yield greater propensity to innovate.  
However, historical evidence suggests that the Republican Party is more closely 
associated with the overall government trend towards decentralization (McLendon, 
2003a).  As such, I might expect that Republican-controlled governments are more likely 
to enact decentralization than either divided-party or Democrat-controlled 
governments.  Therefore, the expected impact of partisanship on propensity to adopt 
decentralization is ambiguous. 
I also include a variable that measures voter turnout in the immediately preceding 
presidential election, a variable that is included as a relative measure of public 
participation.  Scholars have recognized that voting is a primary mechanism for citizens 
to make their preferences known to government (Downs, 1957; Schumpeter, 1994); 
therefore, it is reasonable to assume that, all else equal, legislators in states with 
comparatively higher voter turnout would enact policies that are more closely aligned 
with public preferences.  However, for this to matter in the current context, individuals 
would have to hold consistent preferences regarding state higher education 
governance.   Studies suggest that no form of institutional governance is inherently 
57 
 
superior to another in terms of overall system efficiency and effectiveness; instead, 
governance structures should be determined largely by the characteristics of the 
environment in which they exist (Berdahl, 1971; Leslie & Berdahl, 2008).  Following this 
logic, there is little reason to assume that citizens hold strong and consistent 
preferences for one form of governance over another.  As such, I have no a priori 
expectation for the impact of this variable on propensity to decentralize. 
State Socioeconomic and Demographic Variables 
Drawing from the internal determinants framework, the empirical model also includes a 
host of common socioeconomic and demographic variables that are included in order to 
capture the impact of differences in state population characteristics that exist across 
states and over time, including the wealth, age, education, and ethnicity of the 
population.  These variables have been largely ignored in the governance literature with 
one notable exception:   Volkwein and Malik’s (1997) analysis of the impacts of 
autonomy on university performance finds no statistically significant relationship 
between any state socioeconomic and demographic characteristics (including the 
variables included in the current research) and state higher education governance 
structure.  However, due to the limited utilization of these variables in the literature and 
the differing analytical approach utilized in the current research, they have been 
included as a test of the robustness of Volkwein and Malik’s (1997) conclusions. 
Regional Diffusion of Policy 
Finally, in order to capture the impact of regional diffusion of policy, I include a variable 
that captures the cumulative adoption of decentralization in neighboring states.  
Consistent with many of the studies of higher education policy diffusion, I define 
“neighboring” in this context as being a member of the same regional compact for 
higher education rather than strictly contiguous (Doyle, 2006b; McLendon, Deaton, & 
Hearn, 2007).  This variable provides critical insight as to the composition of the policies 
stream:  A positive and statistically significant coefficient on this variable provides 
evidence that states are borrowing policy solutions from their neighbors.  Given the 
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mixed support for regional diffusion of higher education governance policy, I have no a 
priori expectation for this variable.  
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Table 4-2:  Variable Descriptions, Sources, and Descriptive Statistics1 
Variable Definition Source Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
State Fiscal Conditions    
Tax revenue as a 
percent of GSP 
Total state tax revenue as a percentage 
of Gross State Product, lagged one year 
GSP:  Bureau of Econcomic Analysis (BEA); 
Tax revenue:  The Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 
5.77 1.20 
Tax revenue 
drop 
Dummy variable, =1 if state experienced 
a decline in total tax revenues  from 
previous year, lagged one year 
The Statistical Abstract of the United States .24 .43 
    
State Socio-economic and Demographic Characteristics    
Household 
income 
Median household income, in 2000 
dollars 
The Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:  
Version 4.0 (IPUMS) 
49099.11 7423.66 
Elderly 
Percent of state population age 65 or 
higher 
IPUMS 12.53 1.20 
College-age Percent of state population age 18 to 24 IPUMS 9.78 .97 
Educational 
attainment 
Percent of state population with at least 
4 years of education beyond high school 
IPUMS 16.00 3.05 
Minority 
Percent of state population belonging to 
a minority ethnic group 
IPUMS 20.76 13.03 
     
Characteristics of the State Higher Education System    
4-year 
enrollment 
Percentage of total state FTE enrollment 
in 4-year institutions, lagged one year 
The Statistical Abstract of the United States 67.72 13.38 
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Table 4-2 (continued) 
Private 
enrollment 
The percentage of total state FTE 
enrollment in private institutions, lagged 
one year 
The Integrated Postsecondary Education 
Data System (IPEDS) 
24.18 13.15 
Total public 
enrollment  
The state's total FTE enrollment in public 
institutions, lagged one year 
State Higher Education Executive Officers  
State Higher Education Finance (SHEEO-
SHEF) 
173123.90 222764.10 
Enrollment 
increase  
Dummy variable, =1 if state experience 
an increase in public FTE since previous 
year, lagged one year  
SHEEO-SHEF .84 .37 
Student share 
The share of total educational revenue 
from student (net tuition revenue as a 
percentage of total educational revenue) 
SHEEO-SHEF 32.58 13.42 
Coordinating 
board 
Dummy variable, =1 if state has a 
coordinating board for higher education 
SHEEO .45 .50 
    
State Government Characteristics    
Republican 
Dummy variable, =1 if Republican party 
controls governorship and both 
chambers of legislature 
Legislature:  National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL); Governor:  National 
Governors Association (NGA) 
.30 .46 
Democrat 
Dummy variable, =1 if Democrat party 
controls governorship and both 
chambers of legislature 
NCSL; NGA .17 .38 
Vote 
Percent of state's voting age population 
that voted in most recent Presidential 
election 
U.S. Census Bureau's Current Population 
Survey 
57.52 6.64 
 
  
 
6
1 
Table 4-2 (continued) 
Policy Adoption Patterns    
Regional 
adoption 
Percentage of states in same regional 
compact that have enacted 
decentralizing legislation, lagged one 
year  
Author's calculation 0 0 
1 Descriptive Statistics for variables of interest are presented for the year 2000—the first period of the spell of interest. 
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 Empirical Estimation 
As an initial step in analyzing the data, a Kaplan-Meier survival function was estimated 
and graphed.  The Kaplan-Meier estimator is useful for producing basic estimates of 
survival functions.  It is advantageous in that it takes into account censoring in the data, 
which may occur if an observation drops out of the dataset due to attrition, or, as is the 
case in the current analysis, due to the occurrence of a competing event.  However, the 
Kaplan-Meier survival function is a univariate technique that assumes that survival is a 
function of time and time only, limiting its usefulness to exploratory research only. 
Figure 4-3 provides a visual representation of the estimated Kaplan-Meier survival 
function, both overall and disaggregated by whether or not a state experienced a real 
dollar decline in overall tax revenue.  
Figure 4-3:  Step Function Representation of the Kaplan-Meier Survival Function 
 
As this figure shows, states that experience real dollar tax revenue declines appear to 
have much shorter estimated durations for adoption of legislation decentralizing higher 
education than those that do not experience declines.  While the figure above provides 
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support for the hypothesis that economic conditions prompt decentralization of higher 
education governance, more rigorous, multivariate techniques are needed to confirm 
the validity of this finding. 
In order to provide a more rigorous test of the research hypotheses, a competing risk 
hazard model was specified.  Hazard models (also known as event history analysis, 
survival time regression, duration models, or failure time models) analyze dynamic 
change processes and explain patterns and causes of changes (Yamaguchi, 1991).  
Specifically, a hazard model is a maximum likelihood estimator of the conditional 
probability of a change, or “event”, occurring for individual i at time t, given that the 
event has not previously occurred for that individual.  This conditional probability 
distribution is known as the hazard rate and is estimated using longitudinal data 
collected over the relevant time period, including the independent variables of interest 
as well as a binary variable indicating event occurrence.   
The basic unit of analysis in a hazard model is not the individual (as in cross-sectional 
regression) or the individual-year (as in time series regression), but the spell.  A spell is 
recorded for each individual that represents the duration of time between the initial 
observation of the individual and either 1) event occurrence, 2) the individual’s 
disappearance from the dataset, or 3) the period of observation ending without an 
event occurring.   All individuals are considered to be “at risk” for event occurrence until 
one of these three possibilities occurs.  Spells ending with event occurrence are 
considered to be “complete” spells, while spells ending due to either the individual 
disappearing from the dataset or the period of observation ending are considered 
“incomplete” spells.  All “at risk” observations are considered part of the risk set.  As 
time progresses, the size of the risk set decreases as spells end (Berry & Berry, 1990; 
Butler, 2009).  
Many hazard models are estimated as independent risk models (DesJardins, 2003).  
Independent risk models consider only one type of event through which a spell can 
end—the event of interest.  For example, an independent risk model of transition from 
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unemployment to employment would treat a spell as complete only if an observed 
individual obtains employment.  However, this approach ignores an alternative and 
potentially important alternative pathway to spell completion—in this case, dropout 
from the labor force.  Essentially, this approach treats labor force dropout as not 
meaningfully different from continued unemployment, controlling for explanatory 
variables.  Given that it is realistic to assume that these two potential outcomes—
employment attainment and labor force dropout—are strongly negatively correlated, 
misspecification such as omission of relevant explanatory variables likely introduces bias 
into estimation of coefficients, the magnitude of which depends on the strength of the 
correlation between the event of interest and the competing event.  Likelihood ratio 
tests for model selection can be utilized to provide straightforward guidance regarding 
the appropriateness of competing versus independent risk model specifications (Butler, 
2009; Vuong, 1989).   
Building on the empirical models utilized by  Berry and Berry (1990, 1992) and 
McLendon, Deaton and Hearn (2007), the hazard model utilized in this analysis is 
specified as: 
10 2 3
4 5 76
8 9 10
11 12 13
( ) exp( ( _ % ) ( _ _ ) ( )
( _65 ) ( _18 24) ( _ 4 ) ( )
( _ 4 ) ( _ ) ( _ )
( _ _ ) ( _ _ ) (
h t L taxrev gsp L taxrev drop hhincome
pct plus pct to pct HE plus vote
L pct yr L pctpriv L pubfte
L pubfte increase L stu share
   
   
  
  
    
   
  
 
14 15
)
( ) ( _ ))
republican
democrat regional adoption 


 
where h(t) is the estimated conditional probability of enactment of legislation 
decentralizing a state’s higher education governance system.  Estimating this hazard 
model necessitates appropriate treatment of two complicating factors:  competing and 
repeated events.  First, although the event of interest in this case is enactment of 
decentralizing legislation, it is also possible that a state could enact legislation that 
centralizes higher education governance.  Adoption of legislation of this type represents 
a competing event in the sense that enactment of centralizing legislation ends a spell by 
introducing a change in the state’s configuration for higher education governance as it 
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existed at the beginning of the spell.  For this reason, in addition to collecting data 
regarding enactment of decentralizing legislation, I also collect data regarding 
enactment of centralizing legislation and model these events as a competing risk.   
Second, to simplify the model, I treat the event of interest and the competing event as 
non-repeatable.  This implies that the model focuses solely on primary enactment of 
legislation changing a state’s higher education governance system and subsequent 
enactments of similar legislation are ignored.  This simplification is theoretically valid 
because all included spells are relevant but would be inefficient unless we are willing to 
assume that a model of secondary adoption is different from the model for primary 
adoption.  This is a reasonable assumption given the complex nature of state policy 
adoption.  In other words, a state that has already adopted a policy possesses a differing 
information set from a state that has not yet done so.  
Finally, hazard modeling requires an assumption regarding the functional form of the 
time dependency of the hazard function.  This research adopts a Weibull specification of 
the time dependency, which implies that the hazard rate is allowed to increase or 
decrease monotonically with respect to time (Butler, 2009).  Often, researchers disagree 
about the appropriate parameterization of the time dependence in hazard modeling or 
are uncomfortable making any a priori assumptions regarding the time dependence’s 
functional form.  However, Manton, Singer, and Woodbury (1992) show that the 
specification of time dependency in hazard modeling introduces no serious bias into 
estimation as long as the actual distribution of time is smooth and does not contain 
spikes or discontinuities that are otherwise uncontrolled by the model’s parameters, an 
assumption that is consistent with the current research.  Ultimately, Weibull was chosen 
for purely pragmatic reasons:  Namely, it is a relatively uncomplicated functional form 
and it is the most popular in the hazard model literature.  However, the results 
presented here are robust to alternative specifications of the functional form of time 
dependence.  
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Finally, the model was alternatively specified in order to control for frailty, or 
unobserved heterogeneity.  However, the likelihood-ratio test associated with the 
estimated frailty parameter failed to reject, indicating that unmeasured within-subject 
correlation is not significantly affecting the estimated standard errors.  While people 
often have statistically significant idiosyncratic factors (or disturbances, in econometric 
terms), little theoretical or empirical evidence suggests that states and institutions are 
similar in this regard.  Therefore, the results of the more efficient model—the model 
which does not include a frailty term—are reported here.   The estimation results are 
presented in Table 4-3. 
Table 4-3:  Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the Hazard Rate of State Enactment of 
Legislation Decentralizing Higher Education Governance (Weibull Regression) 
 
 
Coef 
Hazard 
Ratio 
 
Std. 
ErrorA 
Total tax revenue as a % of GSP (L) -2.210 0.110 ** 0.877 
Tax revenue decline (L) (D) 2.842 17.146 *** 1.057 
Median household income (in tens of thousands) -1.764 0.171  1.497 
Pct. Nonwhite 0.084 1.088  0.068 
Pct. 65+ 0.453 1.573  0.368 
Pct. 18-24 0.867 2.379  0.729 
Pct. with 4+ year of education beyond HS 0.284 1.328  0.313 
Pct. voting in last Presidential election -0.253 0.777 ** 0.114 
Pct. of state public FTE enrolled in 4-year institutions (L) -0.122 0.885 ** 0.055 
Pct. of state total FTE enrolled in private institutions (L) 0.071 1.074 * 0.038 
Total state FTE enrollment (in tens of thousands) (L) -.053 0.949  0.035 
Public FTE increase (L) (D) -0.544 0.580  1.248 
Student share of educational expenses (L) 0.105 1.110 * 0.057 
Republican government (D) 0.484 1.622  1.085 
Democrat government (D) 2.580 13.201 * 1.346 
Coordinating board (D) -0.351 0.704  0.968 
Regional adoption -0.337 0.714  5.413 
Constant 5.394   12.696 
p (time dependence in the Weibull distribution)  4.613 *** 1.620 
Wald x2(17)  44.650   
Prob > x2  <0.001   
Log likelihood  -11.258   
Notes:  * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01; (L) means lagged, (D) means indicator variable;                
A Reported for coefficients 
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Discussion 
The estimated model is highly statistically significant, as evidenced by the statistical 
significance of the Wald x2 statistic (Wald x2(17) = 44.650, p < .0001).  The estimated 
Weibull shape parameter, p, shows an increasing hazard over time (p = 4.613) which is 
highly statistically significant (p < .01), rejecting the null of a constant hazard with 
respect to time.  In order to facilitate comparison of the magnitude of the effects of the 
independent variables on estimated average duration until policy adoption, elasticities 
were calculated using the mean values of the independent variables.  These estimated 
elasticities are provided in Table 4-4. 
Table 4-4:  Elasticities of Explanatory Variables with Respect to Estimated Average 
Duration until Adoption of Decentralization 
Variable ey/ex   
Std. 
Err. z 
Total tax revenue as a % of GSP (L) 2.732 ** 1.289 2.12 
Tax revenue decline (L) (D) -0.263 ** 0.107 -2.46 
Median household income (in tens thousands) 1.835  1.593 1.15 
Pct. Nonwhite -0.349  0.312 -1.12 
Pct. 65+ -1.197  1.156 -1.04 
Pct. 18-24 -1.772  1.644 -1.08 
Pct. with 4+ year of education beyond HS -1.063  1.303 -0.82 
Pct. voting in last Presidential election 3.259 *** 1.255 2.60 
Pct. of state public FTE enrolled in 4-year institutions (L) 1.795 ** 0.851 2.11 
Pct. of state total FTE enrolled in private institutions (L) -0.586 *** 0.217 -2.70 
Total state FTE enrollment (in tens of thousands) (L) 0.212 * 0.126 1.68 
Public FTE increase (L) (D) 0.097  0.222 0.44 
Student share of educational expenses (L) -0.789 * 0.432 -1.82 
Republican government (D) -0.025  0.055 -0.45 
Democrat government (D) -0.096 * 0.051 -1.89 
Coordinating board (D) 0.035  0.100 0.35 
Regional adoption 0.008  0.127 0.06 
Notes:  * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01; (L) means lagged, (D) means indicator variable 
 
Consistent with expectation and the limited previous literature regarding 
decentralization of higher education governance, both measures of state fiscal health 
are highly statistically significant tested both jointly (chi2(2) = 12.43, prob > chi2 = .0020) 
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and individually and are signed consistent with expectation.  Specifically, holding all else 
constant, a one standard deviation increase from the mean in tax revenue as a 
percentage of GSP (from 5.7 percent to 6.8 percent) yields an overall increase in average 
estimated duration until adoption of decentralization of almost 52 percent.5  This 
difference in average duration is displayed graphically by Figure 4-4. 
Figure 4-4:  Estimated Survival Function, Disaggregated by Tax Effort 
 
Similarly, average estimated duration until adoption would increase by over 26 percent 
if no states in the sample experienced had real dollar tax revenue declines, holding all 
other independent variables at their means.  Figure 4-5 conveys this difference 
graphically. 
 
 
                                                          
5 This change in estimated duration is calculated as follows:  A one standard deviation 
increase is equivalent to a 19.3 percent increase (6.8/5.7).  This number (19.3) is then 
multiplied by 2.732, the elasticity provided in Table 4, which provides the percentage 
change in average duration associated with a one percent change in the relevant 
independent variable. 
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Figure 4-5:  Estimated Survival Function, Disaggregated by Tax Revenue Decline 
 
As these two variables combine to show, state fiscal stress greatly increases the 
probability of adoption of legislation that decentralizes higher education.  This finding 
provides quantitative support for McLendon (2003a), whose qualitative study of higher 
education decentralization in three states concluded that, in those states, the problems 
stream was prepared for coupling by “state economic stagnation or decline *and+ 
budget crisis” (p. 507). 
Tested jointly, the variables that capture the impact of the state system for higher 
education fail to reach statistical significance at generally accepted levels (chi2(6) = 7.51, 
prob > chi2 = .2759), indicating that, generally speaking, the characteristics of the state’s 
existing system for higher education do not seem to influence the propensity of a state 
to adopt higher education governance decentralization.  However, viewed individually, 
several variables do reach statistical significance.  First, the state enrollment mix 
matters.  States with relatively large two-year sectors (as compared to the four-year 
sector) are, all else equal, much more likely to decentralize.  Given the differences 
between four-year institutions and community colleges in terms of mission and 
clientele, it is perhaps not unexpected that states with larger community college 
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enrollments have embraced decentralization to allow institutional flexibility in adapting 
to these contingencies. 
Second, I find a marginally statistically significant (p = .063), positive relationship 
between the relative size of a state’s private sector for higher education and the 
propensity to decentralize.  One possible interpretation of this finding is that, consistent 
with the multiple streams framework, states are relying on internal emulation to 
propagate the policies stream in creating a window for policy change; in essence, states 
with successful and strong private sectors for higher education are drawing on the 
example of that sector when shaping the public sector.  This finding is consistent with 
Hoxby (1994), who finds that public primary and secondary schools in areas with strong 
private schools evolved to act more like the private schools, both in terms of school 
characteristics, such as teacher pay, as well as student outcomes.  However, given the 
statistically weak relationship between these two variables, the current research 
provides little more than suggestive evidence of this possibility.  Finally, the variable 
associated with the student’s share of higher education costs reaches marginal 
statistical significance but is signed oppositely to expectation:  States in which students 
bear a relatively higher proportion of the costs associated with higher education are 
more likely to adopt decentralization. 
Turning to state political variables, there is no evidence that partisan control of 
government, tested jointly, affects adoption of decentralization (chi2(2) = 4.25, prob > 
chi2 = .1196), although I do find weak evidence that Democrat-controlled legislatures are 
less likely to adopt decentralization than legislatures in which Republicans and 
Democrats split control.  While previous literature finds single-party control of 
government is associated with policy adoption in other policy areas (Berry and Berry, 
1990), the finding that partisanship doesn’t matter for higher education decentralization 
is perhaps expected given the historically nonpartisan nature of higher education in the 
United States (Doyle, 2007; Gladieux & Wolanin, 1976).  However, this does not mean 
that politics does not matter in the current context, only that partisanship does not.  
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McLendon, Deaton, and Hearn (2007) employ alternative measures of state politics and 
find that, consistent with the growing body of qualitative literature regarding higher 
education governance change as well as the multiple streams framework, political 
conflict is a critical component of governance change.  Ultimately, as McLendon and 
others argue, much more work is needed to untangle the complex and evolving 
relationship between state politics and public higher education governance. 
Interestingly, voter turnout is negatively related with propensity to decentralize and 
highly statistically significant.  This is an unexpected finding which warrants further 
exploration.  A rich literature in political science holds that elections are a primary 
mechanism through which governmental officials are held accountable to the public 
(Schumpeter, 1994).    This implies that legislatures in states with comparatively higher 
voter turnout should, all else equal, display a greater degree of responsiveness to the 
demands of citizens and enact policies that reflect citizen preferences.  Doyle’s (2007) 
analysis of the effect of partisanship on higher education policy preferences finds that, 
generally speaking, public concern regarding higher education revolves around two 
issues:  affordability and access.  Are affordability and access impacted by governance 
configuration?  Very little research has addressed this topic, and the few researchers 
that attempt to connect governance to higher education system characteristics reach 
differing conclusions.  Volkwein and Malik (1997) find no connection between either 
institutional autonomy and campus characteristics or institutional quality while Lowry’s 
(2001) cross-sectional analysis finds that, on average, decentralized institutions have 
higher tuition rates than institutions with less autonomy.  Given these mixed results and 
the overall sparseness of the literature, it is difficult to make an empirical connection 
between governance centralization and public preferences for higher education.  
However, this could be an example of perception trumping reality:  Doyle’s (2007) 
analysis also reveals a large degree of public distrust in institutions to honor the public’s 
preferences when left to their own devices (16).  If we assume that legislative behavior 
is at least weakly described by the Downsian model (Downs, 1957), this finding can be 
understood:  Legislators in states with high degree of public participation are more likely 
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to be held accountable by their constituents and are, therefore, less likely to go against 
public opinion and decentralize higher education governance while legislators in states 
with less public accountability do not face the same potential punishment by 
decentralizing.  This hypothesis could be tested in future research by expanding the 
current empirical model to include measures of public opinion regarding the 
trustworthiness of public higher education across states and over time and interacting 
these measures with voter turnout. 
Finally, tested jointly (chi2(4) = 5.39, prob > chi2 = .2497) and individually, the 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the state population do not affect on 
propensity to decentralize.   Again, given the lack of theoretical and empirical evidence 
for a link between public preferences and higher education governance, this finding is 
not surprising and validates the omission of these variables as observed in the literature. 
Conclusion 
This research, drawing on Kingdon’s multiple streams framework, provides insight into 
the complex process of state higher education governance change.  While the existing 
literature focuses on the importance of politics for policy adoption, I find that state 
economic conditions strongly influence state adoption of higher education governance 
decentralization.  Given the stark economic conditions currently facing most states, this 
is a finding that has serious potential ramifications for the future of higher education 
governance across the states. 
Turning to the policies stream, I find little uniform support for either the regional policy 
diffusion or the internal determinants model, implying that much remains unknown 
regarding how states determine appropriate solutions to extant policy problems.  
Kingdon compared the policies stream to a soup in which potential solutions churn, 
bubble, and percolate in a seemingly random process.  Numerous researchers have 
emphasized that this randomness seems especially pronounced in the area of higher 
education governance where the largely qualitative literature emphasizes the influence 
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of the seemingly chaotic political process as well as the specific characteristics and 
personalities of the individuals involved.   
However, this does not mean that researchers should abandon these streams of 
research in favor of lower hanging fruits.  A more holistic understanding of the dynamic 
relationship between states and public institutions of higher education is critical to 
inform policymakers as they struggle to balance autonomy, responsiveness, and 
efficiency in state systems for higher education.  As this research shows, alternative 
methodological approaches can yield additional insight in this regard, insight which can 
refute common knowledge, confirm prior supposition or simply interject additional 
nuance.  However, much work remains.  For instance, the public administration and 
political science literatures have made great advances in terms of expanding upon Berry 
and Berry’s (1990, 1992) original definition of policy diffusion, allowing for more 
complex relationships between states than blind emulation (Sponsler, 2009).  
Integration of these newer measures offers potential new insights as to the formulation 
of the policies stream.  Given the diverse and dynamic nature of higher education 
governance systems, this area remains ripe for expanding knowledge about how policy 
is determined. 
Limitations 
Finally, there are several important limitations to this research.  First, due to the 
availability of reliable data regarding the dependent variable, the analysis is limited to 
only seven years.  As such, the current analysis cannot speak about the antecedents of 
centralization as observation of enacted legislation regarding centralization was much 
more limited over the period analyzed.  Further research is warranted to test the 
hypotheses proposed in the qualitative literature regarding the causes of centralization. 
Second, in order to have enough observations of decentralization to justify multivariate 
analyses, the definition of “decentralization” utilized in this analysis is necessarily broad.  
It captures the entire spectrum of decentralizations which has a theoretical range of a 
small and nuanced which might only change a small element of a single aspect of the 
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balance of power between institutions and states to a wholesale restructuring of a 
state’s system for higher education and everything in between.  Ultimately, as more 
years of observations of states become possible, it would be useful to capture the 
magnitude of a given change in order to reflect the reality of the extent to which 
enacted legislation changes the state’s “status quo” for management of public higher 
education.  Further, the dependent variable as defined in this analysis also covers a 
range of substantive areas and includes decentralizations that are administrative, 
financial, or academic in nature.  Future research should distinguish these substantive 
areas in order to permit a more nuanced analysis. 
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CHAPTER 5  
CONNECTING GOVERNANCE TO INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE: 
THE MARKET FOR HIGHER EDUCATION AND STUDENT DEGREE COMPLETION 
Introduction 
Defining the discussion of state management of public higher education is a 
longstanding debate regarding the most effective approach for maintaining and 
enhancing institutional accountability to the system’s various stakeholders.  Central to 
this debate is the tension between institutional autonomy and political control:  While 
governments want public higher education to reflect societal preferences, institutional 
actors argue that academic freedom requires institutional sovereignty from 
governmental control  (Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003).    
Historically, state governments have embraced the creation of bureaucratic agencies 
empowered with some degree of control over institutional behaviors.  As many scholars 
have noted, several common approaches have emerged in this regard (Berdahl, 1971; 
Education Commission of the States, 1997, 2000, 2007; Glenny, 1959; McGuinness, et 
al., 1994).  However, largely absent from the literature are quantitative studies that 
examine the impact of state higher education governance on the performance of public 
institutions.   
The current research, drawing on a unique sample of 518 public, four-year institutions 
of higher education in the United States, attempts to fill this gap by analyzing the impact 
of market environment on one critical measure of institutional performance:  
graduation rates.  Building on the classic principal-agent framework, I find that 
institutions in states with less competition for enrollments and more centralized 
bureaucratic control have systematically lower graduation rates than their peers 
operating in states with more decentralized governance structure and greater 
competition, suggesting that heavy-handed state approaches to management of public 
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higher education, however well intentioned, may be counterproductive to achieving 
state priorities.   
Traditional State Approaches to Management of Public Higher Education 
Historically, justification for governmental intervention into the provision of higher 
education has been based on the normative goal of equality of access to higher 
education regardless of socioeconomic status, a policy that is couched within a widely-
held desire for social justice (Teixeira, Jongbloed, Amaral, & Dill, 2004).  However, 
positive economic arguments have also been presented that justify intervention—
namely, that the imperfectly competitive nature of the market for higher education 
warrants corrections through regulation and control.   
While a rich descriptive literature exists regarding higher education governance, 
literature exploring the implications of the state governance structure for institutional 
performance in terms of outputs is limited to a series of articles by Payne and colleagues 
who broadly find that faculty productivity—in terms of overall number of publications—
is higher at institutions in states with more decentralized governance arrangements 
(Knott & Payne, 2001, 2004; Payne & Roberts, 2004).  They argue that decentralized 
governance structures “encourage university managers to emphasize the academic 
values of research, publication, and external grants more than undergraduate education 
and low tuition” (Knott & Payne, 2004, p. 17).  In essence, Payne et al. argue that 
academics at institutions unfettered by state controls remain comparatively free to 
pursue self-interest and engage in high-prestige endeavors at the expense of the 
activities preferred by higher education’s external stakeholders.  This argument is 
implicitly grounded in a principal-agent framework in which academics are empowered 
to shirk, from the perspective of external stakeholders, by the absence of direct state 
oversight and control.   
However, a broad literature seems to agree that, even under conditions of strict control, 
effective and efficient state oversight of public higher education is difficult to achieve in 
practice.  Institutions of higher education in the United States are multi-product firms 
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that produce a host of qualitatively differing outputs simultaneously, although 
production of these goods often involves overlapping use of resources (Cohn, Rhine, & 
Santos, 1989).  A robust literature in public administration argues that under these 
conditions, regulatory costs are intrinsically high due to the difficulty of effective audit:  
While regulators can assess easily observable characteristics such as overall costs, the 
complex and multifaceted production function of institutions implies increased 
probability of residual information asymmetries surviving the audit process, enabling 
institutions to capture rents (Laffont & Tirole, 1993, p. 3).  Bureaucrats face transactions 
costs in the creation and enforcement of regulation, which further offset efficiency gains 
through coordination (Laffont & Tirole, 1993; Williamson, 1975).  Even under an ideal 
scenario of complete information, bounded rationality suggests that it is unlikely that a 
centrally planned market could achieve a fully efficient allocation of resources due to 
the fundamental underlying complexity of state systems of higher education (Hoenack & 
Pierro, 1990).  From this perspective, many argue that government intervention into 
markets does not necessarily imply that inefficiencies will be overcome and market 
failures resolved; instead, the case may be that one kind of inefficiencies are simply 
supplanted by another.   
Higher Education Markets and Public Policy 
Drawing on a rich theoretical and empirical literature in economics and public 
administration, the current research argues that the existing literature has largely failed 
to consider a potentially critical ramification of increased state control and management 
of higher education in drawing conclusions about the benefit of centralization:  
decreased inter-institutional competition.  Basic microeconomic theory advances the 
idea that enhanced market competition leads to increases in efficiency and gains in 
consumer surplus.  However, conventional wisdom has held that the market for higher 
education sufficiently deviates from the stylized conditions required by conventional 
microeconomic theory as to limit the applicability of these theories to studies of higher 
education, an axiom that implicitly or explicitly permeates state efforts to regulate 
higher education (Glenny, 1959; Winston, 1999).  Winston (1999), for instance, argues 
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that “economics and intuitions about for-profit business don’t just obscure what’s 
happening in colleges and universities, they can also seriously distort understanding and 
policy” (p. 34).  Leslie and Johnson (1974) similarly conclude that “the perfectly 
competitive market model is inadequate and inappropriate as a policy basis for higher 
education” (p. 17). 
 Is the conventional wisdom true?  Certainly the market for higher education in the 
United States is far from the ideal, perfectly competitive market of microeconomics 
textbooks for a host of reasons (Dill & Soo, 2004; Hoxby, 1997; Winston, 1999).  
However, a rich literature in economics and other fields has largely agreed that the 
benefits of increased competition are surprisingly robust to market distortions.  For 
example, much empirical evidence concludes that increased competition between 
hospitals exerts downward pressure on prices and improves patient outcomes, holding 
all else constant (Gaynor & Vogt, 2003; Keeler, Melnick, & Zwanziger, 1999; Kessler & 
McClellan, 2000; Noether, 1988).  This evidence is sufficiently convincing that the Justice 
Department and the Federal Trade Commission have argued against hospital 
consolidation on the grounds that patient outcomes would be negatively impacted due 
to decreased competition (Ho & Hamilton, 2000).  Similar benefits of increased 
competition have been observed in other imperfectly competitive markets such as 
transportation (Mazzeo, 2003) and primary and secondary education (Borland & 
Howsen, 1992, 1993, 1996; Hoxby, 2000; Sandström & Bergström, 2005). 
How well does the classic microeconomic theory of the firm describe public institutions 
of higher education?  Certainly, it is difficult to argue that the market for higher 
education as it exists in the United States approximates a perfectly competitive market.  
However, this does not mean that the theory of the firm does not provide a good 
framework for understanding the actions of public universities and colleges.  To this 
end, several scholars have made strong theoretical and empirical arguments that the 
market for higher education is best understood through the application of a 
monopolistic competition model (Garvin, 1980; Halstead, 1991; Paulsen, 2000).  Under 
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conditions of monopolistic competition, firms do not produce goods that are perfect 
substitutes as under a perfectly competitive market.  Instead, the products of firms are 
differentiated, possessing unique characteristics which make them imperfect substitutes 
for each other.  As such, firms are not purely price takers, but possess some degree of 
monopoly market power, which is determined in relation to the strength of consumer 
preferences for a specific firm’s product and the availability of acceptable substitutes.  
Finally, product differentiation also leads to non-price competition among producers 
which takes many forms but is designed to influence the slope of consumer demand 
curves, making the demand curve of current consumers more inelastic and the demand 
curve of potential consumers more elastic (Paulsen, 2000). 
As Paulsen (2000) and others notes, these characteristics fairly accurately describe the 
conditions of the market for higher education in the United States.  If universities are 
behaving as monopolistic competitors, this implies that they are, to a varying degree, 
susceptible to the influence of market forces.  If so, a cursory review of the history of 
higher education governance reveals that many states appear to have largely ignored a 
potentially potent and particularly cost-efficient policy instrument in favor of heavy-
handed regulation and control.  However, to date, little empirical literature exists which 
tests the susceptibility of higher education to the influence of market forces.6  This is a 
critical gap in the empirical literature with important ramifications for states as they re-
evaluate higher education governance approaches to deal with the realities of public 
higher education:  dramatic increases in demand, increased student diversity across 
broad socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, and declining public financial 
support of higher education due to declining state revenues coupled with significant 
growth in other state expenditure categories such as Medicaid and corrections. 
A common criticism of the utilization of microeconomic theories to understand 
institutional behaviors is the differing objective functions of private firms and 
institutions of higher education.  Regarding the private firm, the objective function is 
                                                          
6 See Hoxby (1997) for a notable exception. 
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straightforward:  maximize profits for shareholders.  The objective function of the 
university is much more ambiguous.  Much empirical and theoretical literature is 
devoted to developing a better understanding of the objective function of the 
university.  While many argue that institutions are unitary actors driven by the pursuit of 
prestige (Brewer, et al., 2004; Ehrenberg, 1999; Garvin, 1980; James, 1990b), other 
scholars have argued that the decentralized nature of decision making at institutions of 
higher education leaves them best described as “organized anarchies” that lack 
coherent and consistent direction (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972).  From this 
perspective, it is not clear that institutions are sufficiently organized to possess a 
common, cohesive and coherent objective function in any useful sense (Rothschild & 
White, 1993).   
As Massy (2004) argues, a sufficiently generic objective function for institutions of 
higher education is that they seek to maximize objectives that reflect the preferences of 
the internal stakeholders of the institution itself, some of which may be activities valued 
by private markets, others of which may be ignored by markets.  Paulsen (2000) reaches 
a similar conclusion, arguing that the objective function of institutions is to maximize 
discretionary budgets, which are then spent according to the preferences of institutional 
bureaucrats.  Regardless of the exact specification of the institutional objective function, 
all public institutions of higher education are subject to the same constraint:  Operating 
revenues must equal operating costs.  However, critically, this does not mean that each 
individual activity undertaken by institutions must be self-supporting; institutions can 
cross-subsidize activities that are valued by institutional administrators with economic 
profits earned from activities that are less valued but economically profitable.  Critically, 
note that competition and cross-subsidization are inversely related:  As the market for 
higher education converges on a perfectly competitive market, the economic profits 
that make cross-subsidization possible disappear.  While institutions generate economic 
profits from a number of sources (Bok, 2003), for the majority of public institutions, 
tuition revenue is overwhelmingly the largest source of commercial revenue; 
additionally, analysis of institutional financial data over time led Wellman et al. (2009) to 
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conclude that “the dominant revenue pattern across public institutions *is a+ growing 
dependence on tuitions as a primary source of revenue” (p. 13), a trend that is 
illustrated by Figure 5-1 below: 
Figure 5-1:  Institutional Operating Revenues by Source, 1987-2007* 
 
* Operating revenues includes net tuition; federal, state, and local appropriations, 
grants, and contracts; private gifts, grants, and contracts; and endowment earnings.  
Source:  The Delta Cost Project 
Returning to the principal-agent framework, from the perspective of the external 
stakeholders of higher education, this cross-subsidization represents shirking:  money 
that students pay in tuition is redirected by institutions to another purpose, reducing 
the value of the education provided.  Note that expenditures on education and 
expenditures on other activities do not have to be zero-sum for shirking to occur.  Much 
literature agrees that institutions of higher education benefit from economies of scope, 
in which efficiencies are gained through joint production (Koshal & Koshal, 1999).  
However, while economies of scope can offset the negative effect of cross-subsidization 
on undergraduate education, it cannot completely mitigate it:  Ultimately, a dollar 
invested elsewhere is unlikely to have the benefit on undergraduate education 
associated with a dollar invested directly for this purpose.   
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The traditional view is that institutions are constrained in their ability to cross-subsidize 
through the creation of higher education governance arrangements empowered to limit 
and control institutional behaviors.  However, as discussed above, even if we are willing 
to assume that the state is acting as a benevolent central planner, states are inherently 
limited in their ability to effectively constrain institutions by the underlying complexity 
and ambiguity associated with measuring the effectiveness and efficiency of higher 
education.  Further, any efficiency gains due to increased institutional control are offset 
by the direct and indirect bureaucratic costs incurred through regulation. 
The current research puts forth a different argument:  Institutions are constrained in 
their ability to cross-subsidize not by the mechanisms of state bureaucratic control 
directly but instead by their own inherent market power, which itself can be influenced 
by state bureaucratic control.  This leads to the two research hypotheses tested in this 
analysis: 
H1. Institutions operating in unconcentrated markets will have a greater emphasis on 
undergraduate education, ceteris paribus. 
This hypothesis results from a straightforward application of the monopolistic 
competition model:  as the number of institutions included in the choice set of potential 
students decreases, the opportunity for remaining institutions to capture economic 
profit increases.  However, an inherent difficultly arises in calculating the market 
concentration due to the difficulty in accurately defining the market in which an 
institution operates.  Institutions compete for enrollments (and tuition dollars) along 
myriad dimensions that reflect the diversity of student preferences.  Of the two given 
the most attention in the literature, quality and location, only the latter is considered in 
the current analysis due to the difficulty of determining appropriate peer institutions 
along dimensions of quality.  However, there is much evidence which suggests that 
geography is the most important factor in the matriculation decision of many students.  
Hoxby (2000), for example, drawing on surveys of student migration in 1994, estimates 
that 84 percent of students attend a college located in their state of residence.  While 
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this reflects the fact that many students simply want to attend universities closer to 
home, it is also reflective of student response to financial incentives due to the 
difference in prices between in-state and out-of-state tuition at most public universities: 
Recent data from the College Board shows that the difference between average in-state 
and out-of-state tuition surcharges at public, four-year institutions amounted to over 
$4,000 per year in 2009, a differential that has grown significantly in the past decade.  
Similarly, many states have adopted merit aid programs that provide significant financial 
assistance to high ability students but are only applicable to students who attend a 
university located in their state of residence  (Doyle, 2006a). 
H2.  Institutions operating in states with less centralized control over public higher 
education will have a greater emphasis on undergraduate education, ceteris paribus. 
A second influence on institutional market power is the structure of the state’s system 
for higher education governance.  The extant literature largely argues that centralized 
structures should force institutions to honor the preferences of higher education’s 
external stakeholders, which would lead us to think that higher centralization should 
yield higher institutional graduation rates.  However, as discussed above, states are 
limited in their ability to enhance institutional accountability due to the underlying 
complexity of the higher education production function.  Additionally, this argument 
overlooks the fact that more centralized governance structures are designed to 
eliminate inter-institutional competition thereby giving institutions operating in highly 
centralized states a de facto boost in market power by eliminating their competition by 
fiat. 
Research Design 
In order to test the two research hypotheses, a dataset comprised of relevant student 
and institutional characteristics from public, four-year institutions of higher education in 
the United States was assembled.  The majority of the data utilized in this study are 
from the National Center for Education Statistics’ Integrated Postsecondary Education 
Database (NCES IPEDS).  All institutional characteristics are from the year 2002.  The 
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institutional expenditure variables utilized in the analysis represent the average of each 
respective expenditure category from 2002 to 2008 and are divided by FTE enrollment 
in order to facilitate comparisons across institutions of varied sizes.  Data regarding 
state higher education governance structures were compiled utilizing data from the ECS 
and supplemented by data from SHEEO.  National Service Academies, institutions 
located in U.S. territories, and institutions for which complete data were not available 
were excluded from the analysis.  The final sample includes 518 universities from an 
initial universe of 689 public, four-year institutions in the United States and its 
territories. 
Dependent Variable 
The current research, utilizing a broad sample of public, four-year universities in the 
United States, tests the impacts of inter-institutional competition utilizing one important 
measure of institutional focus on undergraduate education:  graduation rates.  
Degree completion rates at public, four-year institutions of higher education in the 
United States have, on average, slightly but steadily eroded over the last two decades 
(ACT, 2008).  Figure 5-2 graphically displays this trend over time. 
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Figure 5-2:  Average 6-year Graduation Rate at Public, 4-year Institutions, 1988-2008 
 
Source:  American College Testing Program 
 
As this figure shows, less than half of all students who enroll in a public, four-year 
institution leave that institution with a baccalaureate degree.  However, what is 
concealed by this figure is the extent of the variation in graduation rates that exists 
between institutions.  Looking only at the 2002 cohort, data from the National Center 
for Education Statistics’ Integrated Postsecondary Education Database reveal an average 
institutional six-year graduation rate of 43.9 percent, with a standard deviation of 17.87 
percent.  As these numbers reveal, while mean institutional degree completion rates 
have remained largely stable over time, there also exists wide variation across 
institutions in terms of student degree completion and persistence, which the current 
research seeks to explain. 
Key Independent Variables 
Two variables were included in the model to capture differences in state market 
conditions for higher education.  First, a variable was included that captures the 
concentration of a state’s market for higher education.  Borrowing from industrial 
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economics, this variable was operationalized as a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of 
market concentration for each state.  The HHI was calculated as:  
2
1
j
j
N
j ij
i
H s

  
Where sij represents the enrollment share of institution i (expressed as a whole number) 
in state j,  and Nj is the total number of institutions (public and private) in state j.  This 
index incorporates several relevant aspects of concentration:  It decreases with the 
number of competing institutions in an institution’s market, with the shares of 
enrollments that come from these other institutions, and with the evenness of shares 
across all institutions (Hoxby, 1997, p. 9).  Numerically, the theoretical range of this 
index is from 10,000/Nj to 10,000, with 10,000/Nj  representing a state in which 
enrollment is split equally among all institutions in the state and 10,000 representing a 
state with only one institution that captures the entire state’s enrollment.  Following the 
guidelines set by the United States Department of Justice in evaluating the impact of 
mergers on market competition (2003; 1997),  states with HHIs below 1,000 are 
considered to be unconcentrated; states with HHIs between 1,000 and 1,800 are 
considered to be moderately concentrated; and states with HHIs above 1,800 are 
considered to be highly concentrated.  The HHI is commonly used in the economic 
literature to measure market competition across a number of substantive areas 
including banking (Berger & Hannan, 1989), health care (Dranove, Shanley, & White, 
1993), transportation (Stavins, 2001), and secondary education (Borland & Howsen, 
1992, 1993, 1996; Hoxby, 2000). 
Second, an indicator variable was included which classifies the state’s higher education 
governance system (Berdahl, 1971; Education Commission of the States, 1997, 2000, 
2007; Glenny, 1959; McGuinness, et al., 1994).  Consolidated governing boards 
represent the most powerful form of governance.  These boards supplant institutional 
boards and have direct control over institutional internal policies, finance, and 
 87 
 
programmatic offerings as well as coordination between institutions.  Strong regulatory 
coordinating boards are boards that are empowered with ultimate authority regarding 
institutional budgets and programmatic control but lack power over internal decision 
making.  Weak regulatory coordinating boards have curtailed budgetary authority as 
compared to strong regulatory boards but still coordinate and control institutional 
programmatic offerings.  Advisory coordinating boards lack ultimate authority over both 
institutional budgets and programmatic offerings and are largely relegated to a 
consultative role in shaping institutional behavior.  Finally, voluntary coordination 
denotes the lack of a state-level board that oversees public higher education.  In states 
adopting this approach, coordination occurs between institutions on a discretionary 
basis and is not compulsory.7  In essence, state approaches to oversight of public higher 
education can be placed on a continuum that denotes the extent to which institutional 
autonomy is curtailed and control is centralized, with voluntary coordination on one 
extreme and the consolidated governing board on the other. 
Control Variables 
Based on the extant literature, a host of variables was included in the model to control 
for critical differences across institutions that impact graduation rates.  First, variables 
were included to capture institutional per-FTE expenditures across a broad range of 
categories.8  Regarding the impact of expenditures on graduation rates, two competing 
schools of thought emerge.  If we make the conventional assumption that expenditures 
are zero-sum (Lowry, 2001a), we would straightforwardly expect that expenditures 
directly related to academic achievement should show a positive and significant impact 
on graduation rates, while all others should have a negative impact on degree 
completion as each dollar spent in these categories necessarily represents a dollar not 
spent on academic endeavors.  However, a robust literature in education argues that 
                                                          
7 See Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation for a more thorough review of the history and 
distribution of these boards in the various states. 
8 See Appendix I for specific definitions of the expenditure variables included in the 
analysis. 
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myriad factors matter to student persistence beyond the academic characteristics of 
institutions (Cabrera, Nora, & Castaneda, 1993; Kuh, 1995).  From this perspective, 
institutional expenditures in non-academic areas could have indirect impacts on 
undergraduate degree completion.  Based on this discussion, while we can 
unequivocally expect a positive impact on expenditures for instruction and academic 
support, the impact of all other expenditure categories remains ambiguous.  A variable 
is also included that measures the percentage of institutional operating revenues 
derived from tuition dollars.  All else equal, we would expect that institutions with a 
higher reliance on tuition dollars should produce outputs that more closely align with 
the preferences of external stakeholders and, therefore, would have higher graduation 
rates. 
The sign of the coefficient associated with the hospital dummy variable also cannot be 
signed a priori.  Institutions that focus on the provision and delivery of health care may 
do so at the expense of undergraduate education.  Alternatively, it is conceivable that 
the health research associated with university hospitals could complement 
undergraduate education and, therefore, could positively affect student outcomes.  
Consistent with the literature, the expected sign associated with the indicator variable 
denoting Minority-Serving Institution (MSI) is positive.  This expectation is based on the 
robust literature, which largely agrees that MSI attendance has positive impacts on 
minority degree completion, all else equal.  FTE enrollment is expected to be positively 
signed, reflecting economies of scale in education; however, the quadratic term is 
expected to be negatively signed, reflecting the diminishing marginal returns of 
additional enrollments due to the fixed nature of institutional capital assets.  The 
expected signs of the Carnegie classification dummy variables are unknown as this 
research represents a first attempt at comparing graduation rates across Carnegie 
categories.  On one hand, we could suspect that the focus of the Carnegie Baccalaureate 
institutions on undergraduate teaching could yield higher graduation rates; on the 
other, it is plausible that the Carnegie Doctoral and Carnegie Master’s institutions 
attract higher quality faculty who are more effective educators.   
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Increased numbers of minority students and students receiving federal grant aid are 
expected to be negatively associated with graduation rates.  Much literature largely 
agrees that minority students are less likely to persist to degree completion than their 
white counterparts for a host of reasons  (Smedley, Myers, & Harrell, 1993; Swail, Redd, 
& Perna, 2003).  Similarly, much research has found that students of lower 
socioeconomic status are less likely to persist to degrees than their wealthier peers, all 
else equal (Titus, 2006).  Increased institutional selectivity is expected to be positively 
related to graduation rates (Gansemer-Topf & Schuh, 2006; Melguizo, 2008).  The 
reasoning for this is straightforward:  Highly selective institutions have more control 
over their student populations and can choose to admit only those with higher 
estimated probabilities of degree completion.  Finally, it is expected that institutions 
located in large, urban areas will have lower degree completion rates than more rural 
institutions.  This is simply due to the increased opportunity costs faced by students at 
these institutions. 
Table 5-1 provides a brief summary of the variables utilized in the analysis.  
Table 5-1:  Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Six-year graduation rate 45.29 16.87 
   Institutional expenditures* 
  Instruction per FTE 7172.80 3088.57 
Research per FTE 2069.91 3999.55 
Public service per FTE 1015.72 1444.63 
Academic support per FTE 1770.17 1072.70 
Student services per FTE 1360.71 650.80 
Institutional support per FTE 2108.58 1075.70 
Operation/maintenance per FTE 1798.73 920.83 
Scholarships and fellowships per FTE  1018.94 662.94 
   Institutional characteristics 
  Full time equivalent enrollment 10288.64 9094.87 
University connected to a hospitalD 0.05 0.22 
In-state average tuition and fees* 5726.19 1933.01 
Percent of full-time freshmen non-white 29.43 27.23 
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Table 5-1 (continued) 
Minority-serving institution (HBCU, HSI or TCU)D 0.14 0.34 
Carnegie Classification 
     Doctoral/Research University-ExtensiveD,O 0.19 0.39 
   Doctoral/Research University-IntensiveD 0.12 0.32 
   Master's College or UniversityD 0.49 0.50 
   Baccalaureate Colleges - Liberal ArtsD 0.04 0.19 
   Baccalaureate Colleges - GeneralD 0.08 0.28 
   Associates and Baccalaureate/AssociatesD 0.06 0.24 
   Specialized InstitutionsD 0.03 0.17 
Institutional Selectivity 
     Highly selectiveD,O 0.17 0.37 
   Moderately selectiveD 0.53 0.50 
   Minimally selectiveD 0.18 0.39 
   Open admissionD 0.12 0.33 
Institutional Location 
     Large cityD,O 0.14 0.35 
   Mid-sized cityD 0.32 0.47 
   Urban fringe of large cityD 0.11 0.31 
   Urban fringe of mid-sized cityD 0.08 0.28 
   Large townD 0.07 0.25 
   Small townD 0.22 0.42 
   RuralD 0.05 0.22 
Percentage of full-time freshmen who received federal 
grants, centile ranges 
     0-24th centileD,O 0.24 0.43 
   25-49th centileD 0.25 0.43 
   50-74th centileD 0.25 0.44 
   75-99th centileD 0.26 0.44 
   State Governance Structure 
  Voluntary coordinationD,O 0.03 0.17 
Advisory coordinating boardD 0.07 0.25 
Weak regulatory coordinating boardD 0.24 0.43 
Strong regulatory coordinating boardD 0.36 0.48 
Consolidated governing boardD 0.30 0.46 
   Tuition revenue as a percentage of total operating revenue 44.17 15.61
Herfendahl index of market concentration 798.23 732.61 
D = indicator variable, O = omitted (reference) category 
  * in constant (2000) dollars, adjusted by the Consumer Price 
Index 
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Empirical Estimation 
In order to account for the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity between states, a 
random effects generalized least squares regression model was utilized.  The model is 
specified as follows:
  
1 2 3 4ij ij ij ij ij i ijR F C G H u e          
Where Rij is the six year graduation rate of institution i in state j; Fij is a vector of 
institutional per-FTE expenditures of institution i in state j; Cij is a vector of institutional 
characteristics of institution i in state j; Gij represents the state governance structure 
associated with institution i in state j; Hij represents the market concentration faced by 
institution i in state j;  ui represents the institution-specific random intercept and eij is 
the residual. 
Table 5-2 presents the results of the regression.  Standard errors were calculated using 
the Huber-White correction for heteroskedasticity and are clustered on states. 
Table 5-2:  Regression Results 
  Coef.   Std. Err. 
State Governance Structure 
   Advisory coordinating boardD 15.296 *** 4.793 
Weak coordinating boardD 8.719 ** 3.700 
Strong coordinating boardD 1.736 
 
3.406 
Consolidated governing boardD 4.234 
 
3.748 
    Higher Education Market Concentration 
   Moderately concentratedD -1.042 
 
1.635 
Highly concentratedD -7.136 ** 2.903 
    Institutional expenditures ($000) 
   Instruction per FTE 0.789 *** 0.192 
Research per FTE 0.245 
 
0.179 
Public service per FTE -0.622 ** 0.249 
Academic support per FTE 0.586 
 
0.377 
Student services per FTE 0.199 
 
0.895 
Institutional support per FTE -1.392 ** 0.550 
Operation/maintenance per FTE 0.865 
 
0.668 
Scholarships and fellowships per FTE  -1.063 
 
0.658 
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Table 5-2 (continued) 
Carnegie Classification 
   Doctoral/Research University-IntensiveD -4.015 *** 1.378 
Master's College or UniversityD -5.495 *** 1.557 
Baccalaureate Colleges - Liberal ArtsD -4.543 * 2.724 
Baccalaureate Colleges - GeneralD -7.036 *** 1.890 
Associates and Baccalaureate/AssociatesD -15.348 *** 2.359 
Specialized InstitutionsD -5.441 ** 2.494 
    Institutional Selectivity 
   Moderately selectiveD -8.027 *** 1.661 
Minimally selectiveD -11.265 *** 2.415 
Open admissionD -14.182 *** 2.306 
    Pct of full-time freshmen receiving federal 
grants 
   25-49th centileD -4.159 *** 1.097 
50-74th centileD -6.571 *** 1.185 
75-99th centileD -8.119 *** 1.296 
    Percent of full-time freshmen non-white -0.432 *** 0.057 
Percent of full-time freshmen non-white, 
squared 0.003 *** 0.001 
Full time equivalent enrollment 0.341 * 0.181 
Full time equivalent enrollment, squared 0.001 
 
0.004 
    Institutional Location 
   Mid-sized cityD 6.514 *** 1.098 
Urban fringe of large cityD 3.795 *** 1.305 
Urban fringe of mid-sized cityD 5.317 *** 1.648 
Large townD 6.193 *** 1.744 
Small townD 9.247 *** 1.422 
RuralD 9.003 *** 2.194 
    Minority-serving institutionD 1.921 
 
2.557 
University connected to a hospitalD -3.981 ** 1.875 
Tuition revenue as a % of total operating 
revenue 4.231 
 
6.074 
In-state average tuition and fees ($000) 1.696 *** 0.395 
    Constant 42.722 *** 6.396 
D = indicator variable,   *** p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
N= 518; R2 = .7748 (overall), .7642 (within), .7624 (between) 
Wald chi2(40) = 36428.15; prob > chi2 <.0001 
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Discussion 
The specified model appears to predict institutional graduation rates with a surprisingly 
high degree of accuracy:  Specifically, the r-squared indicates that the regression model 
as specified explains over 77 percent of the observed variation in institutional six-year 
graduation rates.  This is a surprisingly high value given that, contrary to much of the 
most frequently cited literature on student persistence, the regression model as 
specified includes no measures of student engagement, satisfaction, or integration—
variables that a large vein of the existing literature argue are critical to understanding 
differences in student outcomes across institutions.  This finding adds to the growing 
body of recent literature that questions the causal link between student self-assessed 
satisfaction and engagement and student outcomes (Carini, Kuh, & Klein, 2006; Gordon, 
Ludlum, & Hoey, 2008; Melguizo, 2008).   
Inter-institutional Competition 
Consistent with theoretical expectation, this research finds empirical evidence 
supporting both research hypotheses, indicating that institutional behavior is influenced 
by the degree of competition faced by the institution.  First, the coefficients associated 
with the two dummy variables derived from the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of 
institutional concentration are both negatively signed, although only the variable 
associated with “highly concentrated” achieves statistical significance.  This means that, 
compared to institutions operating in states where enrollments are highly concentrated, 
institutions in states that face greater competition for enrollments have graduation 
rates nearly 7.5 percent higher on average, holding all else constant.  This exogenous 
impact is only slightly smaller than the estimated difference between attendance at a 
highly selective institution and attendance at an institution with open admission or 
roughly equivalent to an increase in instructional expenditures of a little bit less than 
$10,000 per FTE enrolled student, holding all else constant. 
The findings regarding the impact on state higher education governance are a bit more 
nuanced. First, broadly speaking, the results of a joint hypothesis test on the four 
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dummy variables representing board types show that higher education governance 
structures matter in predicting graduation rates (chi2(4) = 26.86, p > chi2 <.0001), even 
after controlling for all the relevant institutional characteristics included in the model.  
However, as the analysis reveals, not all governance structures have an equal impact.  
Specifically, this analysis shows that low levels of governance centralization—advisory 
coordinating boards and weak regulatory boards—have a substantively and statistically 
significant positive impact on graduation rates, holding all else constant (15.2 percent 
and 8.4 percent, respectively).  However, states that have high levels of centralization 
(strong regulatory coordination boards and consolidated governing boards) show no 
statistically significant difference from the reference category (voluntary coordination). 
Control Variables 
As one might expect, institutional selectivity has a large and statistically significant 
impact on degree completion.  Specifically, this analysis reveals that there is a 
particularly pronounced gap between institutions coded as “very selective” and 
“moderately selective,” which translates to an over eight percent decline in graduation 
rate, holding all else constant.  The negative impact persists as selectivity decreases, 
with institutions suffering a three to four percent drop in expected graduation rate for 
each successive decrease in selectivity. 
Carnegie classification also has a strong impact on institutional graduation rates even 
after controlling for institutional selectivity and other variables included in the model.  
Specifically, this analysis shows that students attending an institution classified as 
“Doctoral/Research University-Extensive” are generally more likely to persist to degree 
than their peers at other types of institutions, all else equal.  However, the negative 
effects of attendance at a different type of institution do not differ much from each 
other, with the exception of institutions classified as “Associates and 
Baccalaureate/Associates,” which have a much more pronounced negative impact on 
degree completion—a finding that is not unexpected given that the primary focus of 
these institutions is on two-year rather than four-year degrees.  In general, these 
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findings suggest that, contrary to common perception, matriculation to research 
institutions does not negatively impact student persistence, holding all else constant; 
further, there appears to be no distinct advantage in terms of probability of degree 
completion to attendance at a primarily baccalaureate college or university despite the 
anecdotal evidence to the contrary. 
Interestingly, the coefficient associated with the hospital dummy variable is negative 
and statistically significant, suggesting that university-run hospitals, holding all else 
constant, seem to divert institutional focus from undergraduate education—a penalty 
that is larger than that associated with moving from a moderately to a minimally 
selective institution.  Certainly, further research is warranted to explore this finding. 
Turning to characteristics of the student body, increased enrollment of students of 
lower socioeconomic backgrounds is negatively associated with student persistent.  This 
is consistent with the extant literature and expectation.  The effect of minority student 
enrollment is similar except that the coefficient associated with the quadratic term is 
positive and statistically significant.  Specifically, this analysis finds that negative effect 
of additional minority enrollments grows until the student body reaches 68 percent 
minority students, which is associated with a 14.3 percent decrease in degree 
completion.  Beyond this point, the marginal impact of additional minority students 
becomes positive, although even at 100 percent minority the aggregate effect on degree 
completion remains negative.  This is an interesting finding which is consistent with Hall 
(1999), who finds qualitative evidence that black students attending predominantly 
white institutions (PWIs) often feel alienated or isolated until a “critical mass” of 
minority enrollment is reached, which counteracts these negative feelings.  Finally, 
institutional size has a positive and statistically significant impact on degree completion, 
consistent with increasing returns to scale in the provision of education.  A back-of-the- 
envelope calculation suggests that increasing returns to scale continue until FTE 
enrollment exceeds 77,000 students, well beyond the range observed in the data. 
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Consistent with expectation, a joint hypothesis test indicated that institutional 
expenditures are statistically significant predictors of graduation rates, holding all else 
constant (chi2(8) = 62.27,  Prob > chi2 < .0001).  Consistent with expectations, increased 
expenditures on instruction have a positive and statistically significant impact on 
graduation rates.  Conversely, increased expenditures for public service and institutional 
support have a negative and statistically significant impact on graduation rates.  All 
other categories of expenditures were found to be unrelated to student degree 
persistence.  These findings are largely consistent with the extant literature (Gansemer-
Topf & Schuh, 2006; Ryan, 2004; Titus, 2004; Toutkoushian & Smart, 2001).  Further, 
while the sign of the coefficient associated with the percentage of total operating 
revenues derived from tuition is positively signed consistent with expectation, it fails to 
reach statistical significance at generally-accepted levels. 
Finally, institutional locale proves to be a statistically significant predictor of graduation 
rates.  Specifically, students attending institutions in large cities are much less likely to 
persist to degree than their peers in other locales, especially those attending schools in 
small towns or rural areas.  Two potential explanations for this finding emerge.  First, 
this could be reflective of the additional opportunity costs associated with university 
attendance in large cities:  More career opportunities exist in big cities, all else equal, 
which may lure students away from institutions before a degree is obtained.  Second, 
this could also be an artifact of the way that degree completion is defined in IPEDS, 
which will be discussed in greater detail below.  Ultimately, as student unit-record data 
systems become more prevalent, these hypotheses can be tested. 
Conclusion 
This research has several critical implications.  First, it has shown that institutional 
graduation rates are quite predictable utilizing only institutional-level data.  While 
research projects such as the National Survey of Student Engagement provide 
institutions with valuable data regarding student engagement and satisfaction, this 
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research suggests that these measures may be somewhat endogenously determined 
and not causally linked to student outcomes such as degree completion.   
Consistent with expectation and the analogous literature in other substantive areas, I 
find strong evidence that institutions of higher education are indeed impacted by the 
effects of competition.  Institutions operating in unconcentrated markets produce 
outputs that are more closely aligned with the preferences of external stakeholders 
than their peers that are unfettered by competitive forces.  This finding contributes to 
an emerging body of literature that collectively provides a strong rebuke to scholars 
who have argued against the application of economic principles to the study of 
education in general and higher education in particular. 
The extant literature suggests several potential mechanisms through which this effect 
can occur, the most obvious being that students attending institutions in concentrated 
states face higher opportunity costs associated with transfer, making transfer less likely 
and student demand curves less elastic.  More complex explanations revolve around the 
informational capabilities of consumers in relation to market competition.  First, the 
mere presence of substitutes (however imperfect) conveys informational advantages to 
consumers by permitting them to compare the relative value offered by each institution 
(Nelson, 1974).  The argument can be made, from a theoretical standpoint, that this 
informational advantage is enhanced in a monopolistically competitive market as 
producers have strong incentives to advertise to attempt to protect or expand market 
share, although to date no empirical research has tested this axiom with regard to 
higher education. 
Finally, I find unambiguous evidence that, holding all else constant, the posture of a 
state’s system for management of public higher education influences degree 
completion.  Specifically, the results show a quadratic effect of sorts with regard to 
centralization:  States with relatively decentralized governance structures perform 
significantly better than both states lacking governance arrangements and those with 
highly centralized governance structures.  While not entirely consistent with 
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expectation, this finding suggests that students are best benefitted by state 
governments content to wear the velvet glove instead of the iron fist.  As Jongbloed 
(2004) argues, while careful government intervention can be invaluable in overcoming 
market failure and establishing trust and transparency, regulation is nonetheless an 
“imperfect substitute for competition due to transactions costs and other economic 
costs of non-market (government) failure” (p. 108). 
Ultimately, while elsewhere the argument has been made that institutional graduation 
rates are largely attributable to factors beyond institutional control (Astin, 2004), the 
current research provides empirical evidence that the impact of institutional behaviors 
on student degree completion is not trivial.  Institutions facing decreased competition, 
be it through market structure or state regulation of higher education, appear to reduce 
focus on undergraduate education and thereby capture economic rents to use 
elsewhere.  Conversely, institutions facing competition respond by increasing degree 
completion, although the mechanisms through which institutions achieve this increase 
in productivity remain unknown and likely vary across institutions.  Given the powerful 
positive effect of competition on student degree attainment presented here, states 
would be wise to pay close attention to their management of public higher education to 
ensure these gains are not lost due to purposeful overregulation or as an unintentional 
consequence of the natural evolution of institutions over time. 
Limitations 
Finally, there are several important limitations to this research.  First, the graduation 
rates utilized in the analysis have several potentially important deficiencies.  They are 
reported by institutions to IPEDS at the institutional level, meaning that a student who 
begins her academic career at one institution but earns a degree from another is 
counted by IPEDS as a non-completer even if the degree is completed within the 
specified six year timeframe.  Similarly, a student who drops to part-time enrollment or 
takes time off and completes a degree beyond the six year period is also treated as a 
non-completer.  While student-level datasets are available through IPEDS, much will 
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remain unknown until state efforts to create and link student unit record databases are 
realized.   
Second, institutional graduation rates are, at best, a proxy measure for what we really 
care about regarding higher education:  student outcomes.  A degree is ultimately only a 
piece of paper; it has no inherent worth beyond its function as a signal of quality to 
employers and society at large.  If institutions are compromising on quality in favor of 
enhanced degree production, the degree’s signaling power is diluted.  While the federal 
government has encouraged states to develop capacities to track students from higher 
education to the job market and beyond, efforts in this regard remain piecemeal and 
access to such data by researchers remains limited. 
Finally, this research only measures one dimension of inter-institutional competition:  
geographic location.  Certainly, while in-state institutions compete for enrollments with 
each other to some degree, institutions also compete with other institutions across 
state borders and along a number of other important dimensions, including quality.  
Future research, building on the current analysis, should move toward a more holistic 
and multivariate definition of competition in order to more accurately model the 
decision making process of imperfectly competitive institutions of higher education in 
the United States. 
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CHAPTER 6   
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RESEARCH PROSPECTS 
Dissertation Summary 
This dissertation encompasses empirical studies that explore state governance of public 
higher education.  Chapter 2 begins with a historical overview of the evolution of higher 
education governance in the United States that starts with the founding of the first 
institutions of higher education in the Colonies and culminates with the flurry of 
proposed governance change that defined the late 1990s and early 2000s.  This chapter 
concludes with an overview of the trends in recent higher education governance 
change, finding that although previous decades have been demarcated by a clear 
overarching preference for either centralization or decentralization of authority, the 
most recent reforms are much more difficult to neatly categorize.  As this chapter 
demonstrates, the debate surrounding the proper management of public higher 
education is an enduring one, even after over 200 years of collective history upon which 
to draw. 
Chapter 3 reviews the extant literature regarding state management of public higher 
education.  It frames the discussion within the context of the classic principal-agent 
framework which, at its most basic conception, defines the autonomy versus 
accountability debate that states face in managing public higher education.  Reviewing 
the descriptive literature through which the widely utilized categorizations of state 
governance structures have been defined, finding that while much agreement regarding 
these categorizations exists, recent governance changes largely work within these 
categorizations, limiting their empirical usefulness.  Closing with a review of the sparse 
literature which connects governance structure to system characteristics finding that, 
while a limited literature exists that connects governance characteristics and 
institutional inputs, nearly no research has attempted to link governance arrangements 
to institutional performance in terms of outputs produced.   
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Chapter 4 explores the antecedents of higher education governance decentralization.  
The extant literature has focused almost exclusively on the role of the political process 
as a driver of higher education governance change, providing rich qualitative case 
studies of the influence of politics in the formulation of higher education policies.  
Drawing on Kingdon’s (2003) multiple streams framework, this analysis argues that this 
literature has provided an incomplete picture of policy change.  Utilizing hazard 
modeling, I find that state economic conditions, which have been largely ignored by the 
literature, emerge as strong predictors of state decentralization of higher education 
governance.  Specifically, all else constant, I find that states with greater tax efforts are 
much less likely to decentralize while states experiencing tax revenue declines are much 
more likely to adopt decentralization.  Given the current economic conditions facing the 
majority of states, this finding implies that we should expect to see more states enact 
legislation enhancing institutional autonomy and decreasing state control in the near 
future.  What are the implications of this finding for system performance?  To date, the 
paucity of the empirical literature connecting governance structure to institutional 
outputs and outcomes leaves this question largely unanswered. 
Chapter 5, the second empirical chapter, attempts to answer this question by 
connecting the environment in which an institution operates with one critical measure 
of institutional output:  student degree completion rates.  Historically, state intervention 
into the provision of public higher education has been justified as a way to not only 
protect access for traditionally underserved groups but also as a mechanism for 
enhancing system efficiency through inter-institutional coordination.  However, this 
argument largely discounts another potential source for enhancing system efficiency:  
inter-institutional competition.  Consistent with a large body of literature in economics, 
Chapter 5 finds that institutions operating in more competitive states have higher 
institutional graduation rates than those subjected to less competition, all else equal.  
This finding suggests that, while some benefits are realized by state intervention into 
public higher education, the positive effects in this regard can be negated by overly 
stringent controls. 
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Policy Discussion 
The findings of this dissertation inform ongoing policy debates regarding the 
appropriate relationship between states and public institutions of higher education and 
the impact of these interrelationships on system performance.  These findings are of 
particular importance to inform policy makers across states as they struggle to reconcile 
large, structural budget deficits with increased public demand for higher education as 
well as entitlement programs such as Medicaid, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF), and unemployment benefits, which historically have crowded out state 
spending for higher education (Doyle & Delaney, 2009). 
This research suggests that, if trends hold, we should expect to see a wave of 
decentralization of higher education governance in response to broadly declining 
economic conditions across states.  However, as the second empirical chapter 
demonstrates, decentralization may be inherently negative for the students enrolled at  
public institutions of higher education; conversely, if decentralization increases inter-
institutional competition, there is much reason to suspect that students could benefit, 
at least in terms of degree completion.  However, decentralization is not a panacea—
this research shows that too much decentralization has consequences which are as 
negative as too little decentralization.  Further, researchers have long worried about the 
consequences of deregulation of higher education in terms of access and affordability 
for traditionally underserved groups and minorities, issues that remain unanswered by 
this dissertation.  Ultimately, state efforts in this regard must seek to strike a balance 
between regulation and market mechanisms for enhancing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of our system of public higher education if it is to remain a driver of 
economic development moving forward. 
Limitations and Future Research 
There are several key limitations to this dissertation that suggest particularly fruitful 
avenues for further research.  First, both empirical chapters rely heavily on the 
categorizations of state higher education governance structures originally published by 
 103 
 
Paltridge (1965) and Berdahl (1971) and maintained by the Education Commission of the 
States.  While this categorization’s usefulness is demonstrated by its widespread use in 
the extant literature, much nuance in terms of the specific delegation of authority is 
missed by these categorizations, especially across the various types of coordinating 
boards.  Future research would benefit from a more nuanced analysis of governance 
structures that draws on the delegation of specific authority and power which is 
germane to the research question at hand.  As an example, consider state policy 
regarding tuition setting.  While tuition-setting authority is generally delegated 
consistently across governance structures, this is not always the case:  Kentucky’s 
relatively weak coordinating board enjoys tuition-setting authority, as does the 
coordinating board of Oklahoma.  Additionally, a few states, such as Florida, a governing 
board state, and Louisiana, a strong coordinating board state, have enacted direct or 
indirect legislative control over tuition setting.  As one might imagine, any analysis that 
utilizes the broad categorizations of governance structures to analyze tuition policies 
could potentially identify spurious relationships due to these inconsistencies.  As 
researchers delve more deeply into the nuances of higher education governance 
structures, these limitations can be overcome to the benefit of both academics in the 
pursuit of knowledge as well as practitioners who utilize scholarly research to inform 
policy. 
A second important limitation to this dissertation is its reliance on statutory or 
constitutional definitions of the relationship between institutions and states, which may 
or may not accurately reflect the state-institution relationship as it actually exists in 
practice.  As the rich case study literature regarding higher education governance 
attests, in many states differences exist between the de jure and de facto balance of 
power between states and institutions, the latter of which involves unwritten norms, 
rules, and traditions as well as the social and political capital of the actors involved—all 
of which are difficult to accurately measure for the purposes of quantitative analysis.  
This speaks to the importance of mixed methods approaches to the study of higher 
education governance, which allows researchers to continue to build on the foundations 
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established by the extant literature and further explore the interrelationships as they 
exist across states. 
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APPENDIX I: 
IPEDS EXPENDITURE CATEGORY DEFINITIONS 
Instruction  
Expenditures of the colleges, schools, departments, and other instructional divisions of 
the institution and expenditures for departmental research and public service that are 
not separately budgeted. Includes expenditures for credit and noncredit activities. 
Excludes expenditures for academic administration where the primary function is 
administration (e.g., academic deans). Also includes general academic instruction, 
occupational and vocational instruction, special session instruction, community 
education, preparatory and adult basic education, and remedial and tutorial instruction 
conducted by the teaching faculty for the institution's students. 
Research  
Funds expended for activities specifically organized to produce research outcomes and 
commissioned by an agency either external to the institution or separately budgeted by 
an organizational unit within the institution. Does not include non-research 
expenditures (e.g., training). 
Public service  
Funds budgeted specifically for public service and expended for activities established 
primarily to provide non-instructional services beneficial to groups external to the 
institution. Examples are seminars and projects provided to particular sectors of the 
community and expenditures for community services and cooperative extension 
services. 
Academic support  
Expenditures for the support services that are an integral part of the institution's 
primary mission of instruction, research, or public service. Includes expenditures for 
libraries, museums, galleries, audiovisual services, academic computing support, 
ancillary support, academic administration, personnel development, and course and 
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curriculum development.  Also includes expenditures for veterinary and dental clinics if 
their primary purpose is to support the institutional program. 
Student services  
Funds expended for admissions, registrar activities, and activities whose primary 
purpose is to contribute to students' emotional and physical well-being and to their 
intellectual, cultural, and social development outside the context of the formal 
instructional program.  Examples are career guidance, counseling, financial aid 
administration, and student health services (except when operated as a self-supporting 
auxiliary enterprise). 
Institutional support  
Expenditures for the day-to-day operational support of the institution. Includes 
expenditures for general administrative services, executive direction and planning, legal 
and fiscal operations, and public relations and development. Excludes expenditures for 
physical plant operations. 
Operation and maintenance of plant  
Expenditures for operations established to provide service and maintenance related to 
campus grounds and facilities used for educational and general purposes. Specific 
expenditures include expenditures for utilities, fire protection, property insurance, and 
similar items. Excludes expenditures made from the institutional plant fund accounts. 
Scholarships and fellowships  
Expenditures made in the form of outright grants-in-aid, tuition and fee waivers, prizes 
and trainee stipends to individuals enrolled in formal undergraduate or graduate 
coursework, either for credit or noncredit.  Includes Pell grants and aid to students in 
the form of tuition or fee remissions.  Excludes those remissions that are granted 
because of faculty or staff status, or for which services to the institution must be 
rendered, such as payment for teaching, or student loans. Also excludes College Work-
Study Program expenses. 
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